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I. Introduction 
Corporations typically retain statutory personal rights with 
respect to commercial activity, such as the rights to own property, 
to sue and be sued, and to enter into contracts.1 But the extent to 
which corporations have constitutional personal rights, such as 
the right to free speech,2 is the source of debate among courts, 
legislatures, citizens, the legal academy, and, of course, 
corporations.  
The academic community has analyzed corporations—
particularly their essence, rights, and purposes—throughout 
their evolution. Corporate law encompasses many theories, and 
virtually every theory either aims to answer any of three basic 
questions or presumes a position on those questions in order to 
tackle a more nuanced issue.3 These three questions, therefore, 
are a defining feature of corporate theory as an area of study.  
First, what is a corporation’s essence? Most theories describe 
a corporation’s essence in terms of one of two metaphors: an 
entity that exists separately from its shareholders or a mere 
aggregation of the corporation’s constituents.4 This Note will refer 
to this distinction as the corporate-essence dichotomy.  
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(4) (2012) (providing a 
corporation’s right to own property); id. § 122(2) (stating that a corporation may 
sue and be sued); id. § 122(13) (providing a corporation’s right to contract); see 
also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating that, in congressional acts, the word “person” 
presumptively includes corporations). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 3. Although this Note categorizes the theories by how they answer certain 
questions, scholars conceptualize corporate theories in many different ways 
because the theories and their interrelation are complicated. See, e.g., Susanna 
K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the 
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 97 (2009) 
(providing a different organization of theories). 
 4. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201 
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Second, what are the rights of a corporation? Many theories 
presume or posit that corporations represent either artificial 
creations of state law, thereby only possessing such rights as are 
explicitly granted by statute, or natural products of private 
initiative, thereby possessing rights beyond those granted by 
statute.5 This Note will refer to this distinction as the corporate-
rights dichotomy.  
Third, what are the purposes and goals of corporations? Some 
theories argue that corporations are mechanisms purely for 
private investment, aiming to maximize shareholder wealth. 
Other theories assert that corporations are vehicles both for 
private investment and for broader, public purposes, considering 
also the betterment of the economy and society.6 This Note will 
refer to this distinction as the corporate-purpose dichotomy. 
Often, intimately tied to this final question is an analysis of the 
balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors 
because that balance seems to indicate how corporations ought to 
be governed.7 This Note, however, will not discuss particular 
governance theories because they implicitly answer one of the 
three main questions common to virtually all corporate-law 
                                                                                                     
(1990) (distinguishing the corporation as an entity from that as “a mere 
aggregation of natural individuals without a separate existence”).  
 5. See Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: 
Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 1911, 1915 (2010) (discussing the real-entity and artificial-entity theories 
of corporate personhood) (citations omitted). Lipton uses the phrase “conclusions 
about the nature of corporate personhood” to mean rights derived from some 
corporate essence. Id.  
 6. See Millon, supra note 4, at 201 (discussing a development in corporate 
theory focusing on a public–private distinction about “the nature of corporate 
activity and the appropriate goals of corporate law”). “According to one view, 
corporate activity has broad social and political ramifications that justify a body 
of corporate law that is deliberately responsive to public interest concerns. The 
alternative viewpoint portrays corporate law as governing little more than the 
private relations between the shareholders of the corporation and 
management . . . .” Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of 
Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1396 (2008) (introducing the “nexus of 
contracts” theory, the “team production” theory, and the “shareholder primacy” 
theory as answering the question, “[W]hose interests are corporate decision-
makers to pursue?”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (discussing 
different theories about the means of corporate governance in terms of the 
division of power between the board and shareholders).  
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theories, and thus fall within the general discussion of this Note.8 
Because of the importance of personal rights and the public 
attention to corporate personal rights, this Note focuses on the 
second of the three questions—the corporate-rights dichotomy—
but also heavily implicates the first question, the corporate-
essence dichotomy. 
In 2010, Citizens United v. FEC9 stirred debate of 
corporations’ personal rights under the U.S. Constitution.10 The 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded, first, that “the Government may 
not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
corporate identity.”11 Second, the Court overruled a law that 
prohibited corporate independent campaign expenditures on the 
grounds that the law was a ban on speech violating the First 
Amendment.12 The Court had already held, in a previous case, 
that speech could not be restricted solely because the speaker was 
a corporation,13 but the effect of Citizens United—that 
corporations may now spend unlimited funds advocating the 
success or defeat of candidates under the protection of the First 
                                                                                                     
 8. For example, the nexus-of-contracts theory, which views the corporate 
power structure as an aggregation of private interests, implicitly answers the 
corporate-essence question: the corporation must be an aggregation, not an 
entity. See Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More Than a 
Nexus-of-Contracts, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 215 (2011) (“The aggregate theory is 
generally understood to capture the nexus-of-contracts view, the artificial-entity 
theory captures concession theory, and the real-entity theory arguably captures 
the director-primacy view of the corporation.” (citation omitted)); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, in 1 ACCOUNTING, ECONOMICS, 
AND LAW 1, 25 n.142 (2011) (“The point that the nexus-of-contracts theory is a 
reinvention of the aggregate view has been made repeatedly.”). 
 9. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 10. See id. at 913–16 (stating that the government could not suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity and that a 
federal statute barring corporate expenditures for campaigns violated the First 
Amendment). 
 11. Id. at 913. 
 12. Id. at 896–98. 
 13. See id. at 913 (relying on previous U.S. Supreme Court holdings that 
restricting campaign expenditures amounts to a restriction on speech and that 
the government may not restrict corporate speech); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (holding that a Massachusetts statute 
prohibiting certain corporate political expenditures violates the First 
Amendment). 
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Amendment—has itself sparked considerable discourse among 
the media and the general public.14  
One source of public concern is that corporate entities can 
overwhelm the voices of individual citizens by pouring their 
amassed wealth into lobbying efforts and media ownership.15 
Indeed, if corporations dominate both the media and elected 
offices, they can essentially control policy and law. Even private 
business owners or wealthy individuals typically cannot rival a 
large corporation’s resources.16 Such power is self-perpetuating 
because corporations can then use their influence to enhance 
their own wealth-seeking interests.17 Thus, members of the public 
often fear that corporations will have a corruptive influence on 
government officials.18  
                                                                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Corporate Sponsorship Is Campaign Issue on 
Which Both Parties Can Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, at A15 (providing 
poll results and statements of political figures who oppose unlimited corporate 
campaign expenditure); Alex Blumberg, Forget Stocks or Bonds, Invest in a 
Lobbyist, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/ 
2012/01/06/144737864/forget-stocks-or-bonds-invest-in-a-lobbyist (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2012) (reporting results of a study showing a corporate tax benefit of 
$220 on every dollar spent lobbying for the benefit) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Jason Potteiger, ‘Occupiers’ Reflect on Movement One 
Year Later, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/13/ 
161103621/occupiers-reflect-on-movement-on-year-later (last visited Sept. 28, 
2012) (“[W]e want a constitutional amendment to reverse Citizens United or we 
want to end corporate personhood.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 15. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert 
Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1628 (1999) (listing major corporations 
that own corporate media subsidiaries such as ABC, NBC, and FOX News). 
 16. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) (refusing to 
recognize a government interest in corporations’ having an unfair advantage by 
using “resources amassed in the economic marketplace” (quoting Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990))). 
 17. See Supplemental Brief Amicus Curiae of the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press in Support of Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 904 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2219299 at *2–3 (“The original, 
laudable intent of Congress presumably was to limit speech by corporations that 
seek to promote their own interests by influencing elections, while continuing to 
allow all other commentary (either non-corporate entities or by the news media) 
on political issues.”). 
 18. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 (addressing and rejecting the 
argument that the government has a sufficiently important interest in 
preventing corruption, based on corporate independent expenditures, of elected 
officials). 
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In Citizens United, however, the Federal Judiciary—the only 
Branch structurally insulated from political influence19—
defended corporations’ right to freely spend their funds on 
electioneering communications under the highest protection of 
the law.20 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected its earlier policy-
based position against the distorted corporate influence and 
political corruption that would likely accompany unlimited 
corporate campaign expenditures.21 The decision leaves 
individual citizens and the legal community with the question: 
What kind of person is a corporation, such that it can speak 
under protection of the Constitution?  
Central to the debate, and the focus of this Note, is how 
Citizens United has affected corporate personhood in theory and 
in practice. In particular, the public’s criticism of the 2010 case 
amplifies the flaw in the idea that we can deduce traits from a 
corporate person or essence—a notion that is fundamental to 
corporate-rights theories.22 Additionally, Citizens United 
indicates the U.S. Supreme Court’s stance on justifying corporate 
rights.  
This Note focuses exclusively on publicly held businesses 
because the corporate rights debate primarily raises issues with 
the influence and standard characteristics of large-scale 
enterprises. The idea of corporate personhood does not raise the 
same questions with closely held companies whose owners also 
retain control over decisionmaking.23 
Part II of this Note discusses theories about characteristics of 
the corporate form prior to Citizens United, arising out of the 
entity and aggregate theories of corporate form (the corporate-
                                                                                                     
 19. Federal judges are theoretically insulated from the politics involved in 
elected offices and nontenured positions. See Girardeau A. Spann, Expository 
Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 636 (1983) (“[The Judiciary] has been insulated 
purposely from immediate political accountability.”). 
 20. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (applying constitutional 
protections and a strict-scrutiny analysis to state that corporate independent 
expenditures are permissible). 
 21. See id. at 902−11 (overruling precedent that permits a ban on political 
speech under the “antidistortion” and “anticorruption” rationales). 
 22. See infra Part II (discussing corporate-rights theories). 
 23. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1386 n.1 (implying that issues arise from 
the separation of ownership and control, which is characteristic of publicly held 
businesses rather than those that are closely held). 
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essence dichotomy).24 This Part then raises two important 
critiques of these theories that resurface in later discussion.25 
Part III analyzes the Citizens United opinion as it relates to 
corporate-rights theories and its repercussions in law and 
society.26 Part IV revives the two critiques from Part II to reject 
the notion that rights can be deduced from any theoretical 
conception of the corporation.27 Because no corporate-law theories 
can provide an appropriate source from which the U.S. Supreme 
Court can ascribe rights to the corporation, this Part then 
identifies the proper source.28 Specifically, the opinion’s language 
suggests that the Court grounds the right to corporate political 
speech in public policy.29 Finally, based on this refined reading of 
Citizens United, Part V provides more accurate bases for 
criticizing the opinion or otherwise addressing the public’s 
concerns.30  
Part VI concludes by reiterating the overarching argument of 
this Note: (1) Citizens United is unclear about the source of the 
corporate political speech right; (2) because the Court fails to 
make the source clear, public criticism of Citizens United is 
misguided; (3) the source for the constitutional corporate speech 
right is public policy, not some existential truth about the 
corporate form; and (4) real, functional claims about corporate 
rights only relate to corporate-rights theories in the sense that 
these theories are metaphors to discuss the real rights.31 
                                                                                                     
 24. See infra Part II.A (discussing entity and aggregate theories). 
 25. See infra Part II.B (discussing the circularity problem). 
 26. See infra Part III (discussing Citizens United). 
 27. See infra Part IV (finding a fatal flaw in using entity and aggregate 
theories to deduce corporate rights). 
 28. See infra Part IV (finding the real source of the corporate speech right). 
 29. See infra Part IV (dissecting Citizens United to find the source of the 
corporate speech right). 
 30. See infra Part V (describing a proper analysis). 
 31. See infra Part VI (concluding that the Court failed in its duty to justify 
the right of corporate political speech by not clearly explaining its source). 
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II. Corporate Form Pre-Citizens United 
A. Entity and Aggregate Theories of Corporate Form 
By the nineteenth century, corporate America began to 
develop from joint stock trading companies and partnerships into 
quasi-public entities.32 As legislators and courts unequivocally 
granted corporate entities rights that, by statute, explicitly 
applied to persons,33 complex corporate-law questions led 
theorists to contemplate the ontology of the corporate legal 
personality.34 Generally, nineteenth-century theories 
conceptualized the corporate form either as an entity separate 
from its shareholders or as an aggregate of its members,35 and 
theorists attempted to deduce inherent rights or characteristics 
based on the corporate form.36  
Under the artificial-entity theory of corporate personhood, 
which “character[ized] . . . legal discourse for much of the 19th 
century,”37 the corporation is a mere “creature of the law, whose 
rights consist[] only of those conferred by the state.”38 The 
                                                                                                     
 32. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 11 (rev. ed. 1968) (outlining the development of the 
corporate form). 
 33. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–
1960, at 66–67 (1992) (discussing the impact of an 1886 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision finding—without explanation—that “a corporation was a person under 
the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 
U.S. 394 (1886))). 
 34. See id. at 67, 70–76, 98–107 (discussing various theories of corporate 
personhood developing around the turn of the nineteenth century).  
 35. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 3 & n.10 (stating that the 
aggregate theory, the artificial-entity theory, and the real-entity theory are 
“standard theories found in literature”). The essence of these theories can be 
traced back to before the nineteenth century. See id. at 4–6 (discussing the 
history of corporate theories). But the “shift from small, closely held enterprises 
to massive, publicly held ones” led to a “re-examination of the corporate form” 
under these three theories. Id. at 14. 
 36. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1387–88 (describing Sir Edward Coke’s 
theory that a corporation is an artificial legal person); Jess M. Krannich, The 
Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 66–86 (2005) (providing 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent for “the artificial-entity theory, the aggregate 
entity theory, and the real-entity theory” (citations omitted)). 
 37. Millon, supra note 4, at 211. 
 38. Lipton, supra note 5, at 1915 (citations omitted).  
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corporate entity, under this view, is a legal fiction that exists only 
to the extent that statutory law prescribes.39 When courts have 
used language indicating an artificial-entity view, they typically 
have distinguished the corporate entity from its members to 
justify state regulation, rather than to imbue the corporation 
with rights.40 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the advent of 
general incorporation laws facilitated widespread incorporation 
by simplifying the state-law requirements, making the 
corporation more universally available as a business form.41 At 
the same time, these laws signified a shift away from the idea of 
an artificial entity heavily regulated by the state.42 Theorists 
recognized corporations as “nothing but aggregations of private 
individuals,” as opposed to entities distinct from their 
constituents.43 Under this aggregation theory, corporations have 
rights derived from the rights of the natural persons behind the 
corporate veil.44 Although not consistently adopting the aggregate 
theory over entity theories, courts have applied constitutional 
protections to corporations on the grounds that “the members do 
not, because of such association, lose their rights to protection.”45 
                                                                                                     
 39. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) 
(“Being the mere creature of law, [the corporation] possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .”); Millon, supra 
note 4, at 206 (“[T]he corporation owed its existence to the positive law of the 
state rather than to the private initiative of individual incorporators.”).  
 40. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (“[A corporation] has no 
right to refuse to submit its books [for state review, but an] individual may 
stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen.”). 
 41. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 75 (discussing how general 
incorporation laws “allowed individuals to incorporate their businesses without 
first seeking a special charter from the state legislature”); Avi-Yonah, supra 
note 35, at 13 & n.75 (providing an example of general incorporation law). 
 42. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 75 (“The immediate effect of the 
general incorporation acts was to ‘move[] the predominant role in corporate 
organization from the state to the incorporators and shareholders.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 43. Millon, supra note 4, at 202. 
 44. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 77 (discussing how courts “imputed the 
corporation’s constitutional personhood from that of the individuals who had 
formed the corporation”).  
 45. See Cnty. Of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D. 
Cal. 1883). 
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The turn of the twentieth century saw significant 
developments in the corporate form, including corporations’ 
acquisition of several legal features that make the public 
corporation an attractive entity form, as we know it today.46 For 
example, limited shareholder liability and free transferability of 
shares promote economic efficiency and investment by 
encouraging risk taking and reducing transaction costs.47 
Similarly, corporations’ perpetual existence incentivizes 
investment.48 Perhaps most significantly, companies with widely 
dispersed ownership vest control in boards of directors—rather 
than in their expanding base of shareholders, whose interest in 
the company becomes so insignificant that they, rationally, are 
apathetic about business decisions.49  
The ownership–control dichotomy, which divides the 
corporate identity between its directors and shareholders, 
coincided with the growing popularity of a third theory in 
legislative, judicial, and academic discourse about the corporate 
form.50 The idea of the corporation as a state-created artificial 
                                                                                                     
 46. See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 72–74 (discussing “fundamental 
changes . . . in the legal treatment of the corporation”); see also STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 4–11 (2002) (describing the 
essential attributes of the corporation and, as applicable, referring to their 
formal codification); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate 
Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 891 & n.9 (2006) (listing attributes of the 
corporation) (citations omitted). 
 47. See David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited 
Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for 
Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the 
Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 439 (1998) (“Limited liability 
promotes the free transfer of shares, which creates incentives for managers to 
act efficiently since the results of their inefficient actions will be punished by the 
market.” (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 42−43 (1991))). 
 48. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2005) (“Unless its articles of 
incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual 
duration . . . and has the same powers as an individual to do all things 
necessary or convenient to carry out its business . . . .”). 
 49. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32, at 84–85, 108–16 (discussing the 
separation of ownership and control among large-scale corporations). 
 50. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 98 (discussing the emergence of 
the natural-entity theory, which recognized a distinction between the corporate 
entity and the shareholders); Cohen, supra note 47, at 435–36 (“[T]he growing 
size of firms and the recognition of the separation of ownership and control in 
firms resulted in commentators arguing that firms were somehow independent 
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entity gave way to a description of a corporation as an entity 
arising naturally by private initiative.51 Coupled with the 
separation of ownership and control, these theoretical 
developments “transformed shareholders from entrepreneurs into 
passive investors who placed their economic interests in the 
hands of professional managers.”52 This advent of the natural-
entity theory (or real-entity theory) accompanied corporations’ 
growth in size and pervasiveness, leading to a corporate structure 
that has persisted as “the dominant form of organization and 
production.”53 Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah has deemed this 
theory the most persistent of corporate-rights theories, partly 
because it is the “most congruent with business realities [such as 
the business judgment rule] as well as the [theory] most suited to 
a corporation–state balance.”54  
The artificial-entity theory, the aggregate theory, and the 
natural-entity theory each have sought to affirmatively describe 
the corporate form, and this debate has in turn prompted 
normative discussion among the academic community as to what 
corporations ought to be.55 For example, the political-speech right 
might appear to attach to corporations pursuant to a natural-
entity perspective: corporations are entities whose speech the 
U.S. Supreme Court has deemed protected, so they have the 
                                                                                                     
of their owners.” (citing Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business 
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987))); see also Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
671, 671–73 (1995) (identifying Berle and Means’s theory on separation of 
ownership and control as a motivating tenet of “the modern era of corporate 
governance scholarship”). See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32 
(discussing the separation of ownership and control in large corporations). 
 51. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 80 (describing the corporation as an 
autonomous being with existence independent of its shareholders and beyond 
state grant of authority); Millon, supra note 4, at 202 (“The aggregate 
characterization did not prove to be persuasive, but the notion of the corporation 
as a natural creation of private initiative and market forces replaced the idea 
that the corporation was artificial.”).  
 52. Millon, supra note 4, at 214–15. 
 53. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32, at xxv. 
 54. Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 19. 
 55. See Millon, supra note 4, at 204 (recognizing that “normative 
implications then are said to follow from the positive assertion [of what 
corporations are]”).  
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capacity for speech.56 Natural-entity theorists (and the general 
public) would then debate whether it is appropriate that 
corporations have the capacity for speech already found to be 
constitutionally protected.57  
The vast majority of corporate-theory scholars, in discussing 
corporations’ rights and the corporate form, adopt (at least 
implicitly) the aggregate theory or one of the two entity 
theories,58 despite each theory’s enduring inconsistencies.59 
B. The Circularity of Defining a Corporation by Inherent 
Characteristics 
All three theories face a problem of circular reasoning. 
Because the entity theories and the aggregate theory all describe 
the essence of a corporation, they inevitably make claims about 
attributes or rights of corporations.60 Attributes such as limited 
shareholder liability, free transferability of shares, perpetual 
existence, and centralized governance may seem to clearly define 
the corporation. Corporations, however, like people, can have an 
indefinite number of characteristics, some of which seem 
inconsistent.61 For example, a corporation can sign a document 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“[T]he 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's 
corporate identity.”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 41 (“The entire Citizens United 
opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are thus reflective of the real entity 
view. Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that 
created them and the shareholders that own them.”). 
 57. See Millon, supra note 4, at 204 (stating that normative implications 
follow from positive assertions about corporations). 
 58. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 3 (“[T]hroughout all of [the changes in 
the legal conception of the corporation], spanning two millennia, the same three 
theories of the corporation can be discerned.”). 
 59. See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text (pointing out major flaws 
in the theories).  
 60. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 42 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1983) (“Theories of the traditional form . . . make the common 
assumption that [expressions for corporate bodies] must stand for or describe 
something, and then give separate and incompatible accounts of its peculiarity 
as a complex or recondite or a fictitious entity . . . .”). 
 61. See id. (“[T]he peculiarity lies . . . in the distinctive characteristics of 
expressions used in the enunciation and application of rules.”). 
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(and we picture this as requiring a human agent)62 but cannot 
swear an oath (though we could imagine a human proxy on the 
stand).63 In fact, as corporations accumulate characteristics, 
inconsistencies suggest confusion in the line of questioning 
between asking about the corporation, on the one hand, and 
asking about the people who comprise it, on the other hand.64 
Although some scholars offer explanations for the “oscillation 
between the three views” over time,65 the reality is that no single 
theory can consistently define a corporation.66 
Two inherent flaws prevent any entity or aggregate theory 
from fully and accurately defining a corporation. First, each of the 
two major categories distorts the corporate form in its own 
direction: entity theories have trouble explaining rights arising 
from the aggregate, and aggregate theories struggle with traits 
arising from a holistic entity.67 Under an entity theory, deriving 
personal rights on the corporation’s behalf may be difficult to 
                                                                                                     
 62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2012) (“Every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and 
duties . . . necessary to enable it to sign instruments . . . .”). 
 63. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1388 (providing the seventeenth century 
view that corporations do not possess bodies or souls and thus can neither “‘be in 
person, nor swear’” an oath (quoting 5 EDWARD COKE, THE REPORTS OF SIR 
EDWARD COKE, KNT.: IN THIRTEEN PARTS pt. X, at *32b (photo. reprint 2002) 
(1826))).  
 64. See HART, supra note 60, at 43 (discussing group personalities, such as 
“‘[t]he crowd was angry’”). 
 65. Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 17. “The Court is trying to strike a balance 
between the rights of the corporations, which can best be protected under either 
the aggregate or the real entity views, and the regulatory power of the state, 
which is best reflected in the artificial entity view.” Id. at 17−18. 
 66. Hart provides examples of inconsistencies under the entity theories:  
[J]ust as a Realist theory appears to tell us that a company “cannot” 
be bound by an agreement empowering another company to direct its 
business and appoint its personnel because this would be “to degrade 
to the position of a tool” a person with a real will, so a Fiction theory 
appears to say that company “cannot” be guilty of certain crimes 
because it has no mind. 
HART, supra note 60, at 45 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Bruner, supra note 7, 
at 1388–89 (criticizing the aggregate theory for its conclusion that “an 
aggregation of souls equals no soul”, which “den[ies] the humanity of what is, in 
essence, a collection of human actors”). 
 67. See HART, supra note 60, at 43 (“Under what conditions do we refer to 
numbers . . . of men as aggregates of individuals and under what conditions do 
we adopt instead unifying phrases extended by analogy from individuals?”). 
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explain; the only sense in which a corporation can act on its 
personal rights is via individual people, and if the corporation is 
in fact a separate entity it arguably should be regulated as such.68 
Under the aggregate theory, on the other hand, replacing a 
corporation’s entire membership would seem to form a new 
corporation.69 As corporations have developed over time, each 
category of theories (aggregate theories and entity theories) faces 
the same obstacle: it must “simultaneously recognize[] entity and 
aggregate characteristics”70 and be somewhat “schizophrenic 
about what ultimately the firm is.”71 
The second inherent flaw in corporate-rights theories is that 
defining a corporation by listing its characteristics presumes 
corporations have inherent attributes that resemble those of 
persons.72 Recognizing the circularity in this reasoning, H.L.A. 
Hart concluded that statements about inherent characteristics do 
not define a corporation; that would beg the question by defining 
what a corporation is.73 Applying Hart’s theory, no corporate 
essence exists from which to derive rights; rather, the legislatures 
and courts must say what rights a corporation has.74 Therefore, 
we must abandon the notion that a corporation can be defined by 
its characteristics and instead ask the question: “Under what 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Cohen, supra note 47, at 435 (discussing the aggregate theory as 
responding to the problem of government regulation of the corporate entity). 
 69. See Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 
253, 259 (1911) (“Any group of men . . . whose membership is changing, is 
necessarily an entity separate and distinct from the constituent members.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 70. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1505 (1989) (criticizing the 
commonality problem of aggregate and entity theories). 
 71. Cohen, supra note 47, at 436. 
 72. See HART, supra note 60, at 45 (“These statements [about corporations’ 
entity or ontological capacity] confuse the issue because they look like eternal 
truths about the nature of corporations given us by definitions . . . .”); Bruner, 
supra note 7, at 1388–89 (considering that there may not be an inherent soul-
like ontology of a corporate entity). 
 73. See HART, supra note 60, at 42–47 (discussing the definition of a 
corporation). 
 74. See id. at 29–30 (analogizing the corporation to a game in which a rule 
“attach[es] a single consequence to the successive actions of a set of different 
men—as when a team is said to have won a game”). 
THE REAL ERROR IN CITIZENS UNITED 2185 
types of conditions does the law ascribe liabilities”—and rights—
“to corporations?”75  
The circularity problem arises when answering the question 
What is a corporation? by listing corporate rights as if they 
naturally belong in the definition. The problem does not arise in 
every discussion about corporate qualities. If the question is How 
does a corporation function in the real world?, listing corporate 
rights such as “corporations can sign contracts” is informative 
and avoids the circularity problem. The claim is now helpful 
because it identifies a corporate right.76 For example, identifying 
which crimes a corporation is capable of committing reveals its 
capacity as a legal device. Consider perjury: a corporate official 
may lie under oath in his role as an agent of the corporation, yet 
courts have held that the corporation is not a person capable of 
taking an oath and cannot be criminally liable for the crime of 
perjury.77 Therefore, legislatures and courts determine which 
crimes a corporation could potentially commit. 
Corporations seem suspect insofar as they retain, through 
statutes or court decisions, certain humanlike capacities while 
escaping moral and legal accountability for humanlike actions.78 
If Congress and state legislatures (and courts, via judicial review) 
make the rules, they cannot hide behind an ontological argument 
to defend unpopular corporate traits. Legislatures and courts 
seem unlikely to use these ontological theories as a cop-out, 
                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at 43. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. See id. (stating that the discussion of the law ascribing rights to 
corporations will “bring out the precise issues at stake when judges, who are 
supposed not to legislate, make some new extension to corporate bodies of rules 
worked out for individuals”).  
 77. See, e.g., State v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 835 So. 2d 230, 
233–34 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (finding a corporation incapable of committing 
perjury); Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60 
HARV. L. REV. 283, 284 (1946) (discussing corporations’ capacity to commit 
crimes). But see United States v. Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 99–100 
(2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that a corporation could be convicted of subscribing to 
a false federal income tax return even though it has been held that corporations 
are incapable of taking an oath).  
 78. “The structure of the public corporation ‘insulates shareholders from 
social and moral sanctions and processes,’ both by rendering them ‘largely 
anonymous’ to the public, as well as by virtue of their ‘relative lack of 
information about how corporate operations may impact the public interest.’” 
Bruner, supra note 7, at 1393 (quoting Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate 
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 798 (2005)).  
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however, but rather as a legal defense of the corporate rights they 
determine. In a 1906 case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:  
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a 
corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth 
Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A 
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under 
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In 
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional 
immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be 
taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against 
by due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. Corporations 
are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their 
aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great 
enterprises.79 
The Court uses the aggregate view of the corporation as a means 
to justify its application of the personal due process protection.80 
Using the aggregate theory as a scapegoat would look more like: 
We wish we could hold that a corporation is not entitled to 
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures, as 
humans are, but we simply cannot because the corporation is an 
association of individuals in all contexts. Legislatures’ and courts’ 
hiding behind an ontological theory to explain corporate rights, 
then, is most likely a figment of the public’s imagination.  
C. The Stance of the Courts 
A common belief among corporate-law theorists is that 
courts, before upholding a corporation’s constitutional rights, 
examine the values and policies underlying those rights with 
respect to individuals and determine whether those justifications 
apply to corporations.81 Courts have performed this task in two 
ways. The first reflects the circularity trap, as described above.82 
                                                                                                     
 79. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (citation omitted).  
 80. See id. (indicating that the corporation derives personal rights from its 
being an association of individuals). 
 81. See, e.g., Krannich, supra note 36, at 64, 104–08 (positing that the U.S. 
Supreme Court should analyze constitutional corporate rights “‘in light of the 
values and policies that are thought to underlie it.’” (citation omitted)). 
 82. See supra Part II.B (explaining the circularity of presuming inherent 
corporate characteristics). 
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This occurs when courts use language that presumes the 
existence of a truth-value for corporate characteristics, as if 
corporations have inherent rights to be protected and we only 
need to discover what they are.83 For example: Is it true that a 
corporation has the capacity for speech?84 If so, perhaps corporate 
speech merits constitutional protection. At times the U.S. 
Supreme Court has adopted this view, most famously in Trustees 
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward:85 “A corporation is an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”86  
At other times, courts have not deduced corporate rights from 
the essence of a corporation. In these cases, traits or rights often 
attach to corporations simply based on courts’ interpretations of 
statutory law.87 If not directly citing to statute, courts have 
justified the attachment of a trait based on precedent or have 
simply refused to elaborate on how or when a corporate trait 
attaches.88 In Citizens United, for example, the Court supported 
the premise that “First Amendment protection extends to 
corporations” with a paragraph solely citing to case law, but with 
no reference to when or how the right attached.89 The right most 
                                                                                                     
 83. See HART, supra note 60, at 45 (arguing that statements such as “‘[a] 
company has no mind and therefore cannot intend’ . . . confuse the issue because 
they look like eternal truths about the nature of corporations”). 
 84. The opposing view would be that the claim has no truth-value: one can 
neither say that a corporation has the inherent ability to speak or that it does 
not. This might be attributable to the fact that corporations can speak in some 
contexts but not others. See supra Part II.B (discussing inconsistencies in 
deducing inherent corporate characteristics).  
 85. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 86. Id. at 636 (emphasis added). The Court paraphrased the language of 
Sir Edward Coke. See EDWARD COKE, 5 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT.: 
IN THIRTEEN PARTS pt. X, at *32b (photo. reprint 2002) (1826). 
 87. See, e.g., NMI Sys., Inc. v. Pillard, 179 B.R. 357, 371 (Bankr. D.D.C. 
1995) (stating that corporations, through officers, can “‘sign instruments’” 
(quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2010))).  
 88. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 66–67 (discussing how Santa Clara 
was the first U.S. Supreme Court assertion that “a corporation was a person 
under the Fourteenth Amendment” and how the Court failed to elaborate or 
provide a rationale). 
 89. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010). The Court cited 
twenty-one cases to support this contentious point. Id. 
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likely attached in the predecessor cases that the Court relies 
upon now for support.90 When courts do not cite to statute or 
precedent, one would hope that the courts’ language and 
reasoning indicate the source of the corporate right; a sheer lack 
of elaboration can be “puzzling and controversial.”91 The 
corporate right to constitutionally protected speech, traced back 
through precedent, ultimately rests on the premise that 
corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment92—a premise that is, itself, unexplained.93  
Part of the reason for the U.S. Supreme Court’s silence might 
be an uncertain balance between state and federal powers. 
Generally, for matters dealing with the internal affairs of 
corporations, the Court looks to the state of incorporation to 
interpret the law.94 Ultimately, however, Congress retains power 
over the entire corporate function via the Commerce Clause.95 
This leaves the U.S. Supreme Court and state courts in a strange 
                                                                                                     
 90. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252, 263 
(1986) (stating that a restriction on direct expenditure of corporate funds for 
electioneering violated the corporation’s First Amendment rights); HORWITZ, 
supra note 33, at 66–67 (discussing the impact of an 1886 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision finding—without explanation—that “a corporation was a person under 
the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citing Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 
118 U.S. 394 (1886)); Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (“[T]he Court has granted 
corporations constitutional rights without engaging in the preliminary inquiry 
of whether a corporation is entitled to them under the Constitution.”). 
 91. HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 66. 
 92. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 & n.15 (1978) 
(“Freedom of speech . . . always ha[s] been viewed as . . . safeguarded by the Due 
Process Clause, and the Court has not identified a separate source for the right 
when it has been asserted by corporations.” (citations omitted)). 
 93. See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 66–67 (discussing how the Court simply 
stated, without explanation, that “a corporation was a person under the 
Fourteenth Amendment”); see also HORWITZ, supra note 88 (providing the case 
that asserts the corporate right without explanation). 
 94. See, e.g., Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933) 
(“[A] court—state or federal—sitting in one State will . . . decline to interfere 
with . . . the management of the internal affairs of a corporation organized 
under the laws of another state but will leave controversies as to such matters 
to the courts of the state of the domicile.”). 
 95. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to 
regulate commerce); Norman R. Williams, Why Congress Cannot “Overrule” the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 153, 216 (2005) (discussing 
Laurence Tribe’s position that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to set 
rules for corporations). 
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conundrum: because state courts do not answer questions of 
federal constitutional law and the Supreme Court avoids 
questions of corporate law, judicial interpretation of the corporate 
entity remains a mystery.96 When the Court then issues decisions 
asserting corporations’ personal rights without explanation, the 
public, not surprisingly, views the decision with a degree of 
cynicism, or at least skepticism.97 
In state courts, of course, the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
the source, but rather the vehicle, of corporations’ personal 
rights.98 In fact, the amendment exacerbates the confusion by 
virtue of its own far-reaching applications. Although corporations 
are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment,99 the Court 
cannot mean that they share the exact same set of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights as individual persons. Even if corporations’ 
rights were a subset of persons’ rights, corporations could not 
“vote on equal terms with natural persons,”100 much less attend 
the same elementary school.101 Thus the question remains: What 
subset of person-type rights do corporations possess? 
If legislatures refuse to say that corporations are a subset of 
persons or share the same set of rights as its members, and 
likewise do not state that corporations’ only rights are those 
                                                                                                     
 96. This Note credits Professor Christopher Bruner with pointing out the 
federalism problem here. Other authors have discussed, for example, “whether 
the internal affairs doctrine is only a choice-of-law rule or whether it is also a 
rule of constitutional law.” Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law 
Beyond State Borders: Reflections Upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 
1164–67 (2009).  
 97. See, e.g., Jeff Clements, “We Never Said Corporations Are People; We 
Said They Are Voices, Speakers, Speech-Makers, a Class of Persons. That’s 
Different.”, CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://corporationsarenotpeople.com/2012/01/23/we-never-said-corporations-are-
people-we-said-they-are-voices-speakers-speech-makers-a-class-of-persons-thats-
different/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (arguing against the Citizens United result) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 98. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664, 666 (1925) 
(incorporating the First Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 99. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779–80 (1978) 
(applying Fourteenth Amendment protections to corporations). 
 100. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate Over Fetal Homicide 
Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 755 n.170 (2006) (citation omitted). 
 101. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (desegregating 
schools under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
2190 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2171 (2012) 
explicitly provided by charter, then the courts cannot wholly 
define a corporation by ascribing some of its rights in a few 
different contexts.102 Finding a holistic framework for 
determining, in theory, whether and when particular personal 
rights ought to apply to corporations thus becomes an arduous 
task—one the U.S. Supreme Court has not fully or consistently 
undertaken.103 Citizens United embodies this struggle with 
respect to corporate political speech.104 
III. Citizens United 
A. Background 
Aside from legal limitations, corporations have the financial 
ability to make large donations, in the form of direct 
“contributions” to candidates or “independent expenditures”105 
toward electioneering, using funds amassed from the efforts of 
individual persons. Contributions are direct donations to 
candidates and have historically been prohibited as a means for 
corporations to spend funds on federal candidates.106 Independent 
expenditures—the type of spending at issue in Citizens United—
are “money[s] spent for a communication that expressly 
advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified Federal 
candidate.”107 The first congressional prohibitions on corporate 
                                                                                                     
 102. See HART, supra note 60, at 41 (“It is easy to see that a statement about 
the rights of a limited company is not equivalent to the statement that its 
members have those same rights.”). 
 103. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has 
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the 
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and 
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories).  
 104.  Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (stating 
without explanation that the U.S. Supreme Court has treated corporations as 
people under the First Amendment), with id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in 
association with other individual persons.” (emphasis removed)).  
 105. 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2000) (defining independent expenditure as “an 
expenditure by a person for a communication expressly advocating the election 
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . . .”). 
 106. See id. at 887 (stating that the corporate contribution ban persists). 
 107. Federal Election Commission, Citizens’ Guide Brochure (Feb. 2004), 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/citizens_guide_brochure.pdf (last visited 
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contributions and independent expenditures were the Tillman 
Act of 1907108 and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
(the Taft–Hartley Act).109 The complete ban on corporate general 
fund political spending endured until the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)110 provided an exception.111 FECA 
allowed corporations to establish separate funds through so-
called Political Action Committees (PACs) to solicit voluntary 
donations that could be contributed to federal campaigns.112  
In 1976, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo113 upheld limits on 
individual direct contributions to candidates, even though they 
suppressed political speech, because the government had a 
prevailing interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption (or the 
appearance thereof) by candidates accepting large 
contributions.114 The U.S. Supreme Court overturned individual 
                                                                                                     
Feb. 24, 2012) (providing information for citizens to participate in the federal 
election process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 108. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (prohibiting corporate monetary 
contributions to political campaigns). 
 109. See Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. 
No. 80-101, sec. 304, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 141 (2006)) (barring corporate independent expenditures to political 
campaigns); Federal Election Commission, The Federal Election Campaign 
Laws: A Short History, http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011) (outlining the history of campaign laws) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 110. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 316, 90 Stat. 490 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (placing legal limits on 
corporate contributions to campaigns).  
 111. See A Guide to the Current Rules for Federal Elections, CAMPAIGN LEGAL 
CENTER, http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=1187%3Aa-guide-to-the-current-rules-for-federal-elections&catid 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (explaining the law on corporate political 
contributions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 112. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2006) (providing for Political Action 
Committees); E. Stewart Crosland, Note, Failed Rescue: Why Davis v. FEC 
Signals the End to Effective Clean Elections, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1270 
(2009) (discussing PACs); Federal Election Commission, The Federal Election 
Campaign Laws: A Short History, http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2011) (outlining the history of campaign laws) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court held that 
expenditure limits suppress constitutionally protected political speech. Id. at 54. 
 114. See id. at 29 (finding that the “weighty interests [that are] served by 
restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are 
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independent expenditure limits, however, because they were a 
severe restriction on political-speech rights115 and did not “serve 
any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or 
appearance of corruption in the electoral process.”116 (This rule—
that the government may restrict individual contributions but not 
individual independent expenditures—is essentially what 
Citizens United later applied to corporations.)117 Two years after 
Buckley, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,118 the Court 
held that corporations may spend unlimited funds on issues and 
initiative campaigns so that the public may hear the corporate 
perspective.119  
In 1990, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce120 stated 
that a prohibition on a corporation’s use of treasury funds for 
direct independent campaign expenditures amounted to 
suppression of political speech.121 Yet the Court upheld a 
                                                                                                     
sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms”). The 
Court stated that restrictions on contributions are the “the Act’s primary 
weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from 
the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions.” Id. at 58. 
 115. See id. at 25 (“The expenditure limitations contained in the [Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971] represent substantial rather than merely 
theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.”). 
 116. Id. at 47–48. 
 117. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (striking down 
the ban on corporate independent expenditures). 
 118. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, the 
Court held that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting certain corporate political 
expenditures violates the First Amendment. Id. at 776. 
 119. See id. at 784 (“[I]t amounts to an impermissible legislative prohibition 
of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may represent in 
public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have 
a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.”); see also 
Nathaniel Persily, Contested Concepts in Campaign Finance, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 118, 121 (2003) (discussing Bellotti’s holding). 
 120. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990) 
(holding that a statute prohibiting corporations from using corporate treasury 
funds for independent expenditures was constitutional because the provision 
was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental purpose). In Austin, the 
Court found that preventing corruption (or the appearance of corruption) in the 
political arena to be a compelling governmental interest because mass corporate 
treasuries could unfairly influence election outcomes. See id. at 660 (“Corporate 
wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of 
independent expenditures . . . .”). 
 121. See id. at 657 (stating that requiring corporations to make political 
contributions only through PACs “burdens corporate freedom of expression” 
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restriction on corporate expenditures because it found a 
compelling governmental interest in preventing the “distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated 
with the help of the corporate form.”122 The Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (McCain–Feingold Act or BCRA)123 and 
McConnell v. FEC124 reemphasized that PACs provide a sufficient 
outlet for corporate speech and asserted the constitutionality of 
prohibiting corporate independent expenditures not from these 
designated funds.125 Specifically, BCRA amended 2 U.S.C. § 441b 
to prohibit corporations from using general treasury funds to 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a political 
                                                                                                     
(citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252 (1986))). The 
Citizens United Court deemed Austin a shift in corporate campaign contribution 
jurisprudence. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (“The Court is thus 
confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids 
restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a 
post-Austin line that permits them.”). But see Case Comment, Citizens United v. 
FEC: Corporate Political Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 75, 75 (2010) (listing the 
history from the Tillman Act of 1907 through Austin as consistently upholding 
restrictions on corporate campaign spending). 
 122. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.  
 123. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain–Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) 
(2006)) (prohibiting corporations and unions from using funds to make 
independent expenditures for electioneering communications or for speech 
expressly targeting a political candidate). 
 124. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003) (concluding that § 441b 
does not impermissibly ban speech “[b]ecause corporations can still fund 
electioneering communications with PAC money”); see also Richard L. Hasen, 
Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 989, 992 (2011) (discussing McConnell); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the 
Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens 
United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2011) (deferring to 
Congress’s bright-line test for defining what constitutes an electioneering 
communication). 
 125. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 104–05 (“Because those entities may still 
organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for such communications, 
the provision is a regulation of, not a ban on, expression.”); see also Case 
Comment, supra note 121, at 76 n.11 (pointing out that the four Justices 
concurred with the portion of the opinion regarding corporate expenditures). 
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candidate.126 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of this provision in Citizens United.127  
B. The Opinion 
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation with funds primarily 
donated by individuals, wanted to air a film that clearly 
advocated the defeat of Senator Hillary Clinton in the Democratic 
Party’s 2008 Presidential primary elections.128 This violated the 
terms of the § 441b prohibition on corporate independent 
expenditures.129  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the five-Justice majority, placed 
the weight of the decision on whether corporations have the same 
rights as individuals with respect to political speech.130 Two 
predecessor cases, taken together, suggested they do: Bellotti 
upheld First Amendment protection of corporate speech rights131 
and Buckley maintained that contribution limits curb political 
speech.132 Members of the public have sometimes generalized this 
as: corporations are people, and money is speech, so corporate 
expenditures cannot be restricted.133  
                                                                                                     
 126. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 
§ 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)) (prohibiting 
corporate electioneering independent expenditures).  
 127. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (explaining the 
relevant statute and precedent). 
 128. See id. at 887 (stating the facts). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 903 (“The Court is thus confronted with conflicting lines of 
precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on 
the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”). 
 131. See id. at 902 (applying Bellotti); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978) (stating that corporations are entitled to protected 
speech).  
 132. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (applying Buckley); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (stating that expenditure limits substantially 
restrain political speech). 
 133. See, e.g., David Kairys, Money Isn’t Speech and Corporations Aren’t 
People, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2010, 9:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/money_isnt_speech_and_corporations_arent_peop
le.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (arguing against Citizens United) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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Justice Kennedy overruled Austin as inconsistent with “the 
principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government 
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
corporate identity.”134 To protect this speech, the Court applied 
the most protective standard: “Laws that burden political speech 
are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to 
prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”135  
A statute restricting political speech based on the 
antidistortion rationale in Austin fails to meet this standard 
because the government has no interest “‘in equalizing the 
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome 
of elections.’”136 Rejecting the antidistortion rationale in Austin, 
the Court stated that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest 
justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations.”137 By finding the conflicting precedent in Austin to 
be a speech restriction based on the speaker’s corporate identity, 
contrary to the First Amendment, Justice Kennedy overruled the 
case as poorly reasoned. The Court also overruled McConnell to 
the extent that it upheld the statute restricting corporate 
independent expenditures, finding the antidistortion interest 
“unconvincing and insufficient.”138 
After dismissing the antidistortion rationale as being 
inconsistent with precedent and with the Constitution,139 the 
Court rejected the Government’s other main justifications for the 
§ 441b restrictions, that limits are necessary to prevent 
corruption of political officials and that shareholders would be 
compelled to fund corporate speech.140 The Court followed 
Buckley,141 concluding that “[t]he anticorruption interest is not 
                                                                                                     
 134. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
 135. Id. at 898 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 
(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48) (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. at 913. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 904–08 (providing reasoning to overrule Austin). 
 140. See id. at 908–11 (rendering the anticorruption and shareholder-
interest rationales invalid). 
 141. See id. at 908 (stating that “‘the governmental interest in preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption [is] inadequate to justify [the ban] 
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sufficient to displace the speech here in question” and that 
“independent expenditures, including those made by 
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.”142 The shareholder-interest rationale, the Court 
stated, “would allow the Government to ban the political speech 
even of media corporations” when the abuse could instead be 
“corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.’”143 
In terms of novelty, therefore, Citizens United’s real 
contribution was its rejection of the government’s policy 
rationales for permitting a ban on corporate political speech, 
rather than the already-established proposition that corporate 
speech is protected to the same extent as individual speech.144 
Regardless of the legal reality, however, the media and the public 
have sometimes interpreted the case differently.  
C. Public Impact 
Citizens United has prompted a wide range of discussion 
among the general public, primarily criticism.145 But the fear that 
large public corporations would use amassed funds to make 
sweeping expenditures has greatly subsided as the public has 
realized how relatively little corporations have spent on 
campaigns.146 Corporations’ hesitancy is most likely because 
                                                                                                     
on independent expenditures’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976))). 
 142. Id. at 908–09. 
 143. Id. at 911 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
794 (1978)). 
 144. See Allison R. Hayward, Citizens United: Correct, Modest, and Overdue, 
2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 1, 2–3 (2010) (discussing that Citizens United does 
not overturn long-standing precedent). 
 145. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 2 & n.3 (listing responses); Robert 
L. Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner’s Error in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 311, 311–
12 (2010) (listing a range of reactions to the case). 
 146. See Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political 
Game?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine 
/how-much-has-citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html?pagewanted= 
all (last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (“[W]hile it is true that corporations can now give 
money for specific purposes that were prohibited before, it seems they 
aren’t . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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publicly traded companies have to answer to shareholders and 
customers about any questionable use of funds.147 The election 
statistics from the first presidential general election since 
Citizens United support this result. For example, companies 
“contributed roughly $75 million to super PACs in the 2012 
election cycle,”148 compared with the approximately $661 million 
super PACs raised overall in that cycle.149  
Some fears about the influence of super PACs and Citizens 
United, however, have materialized. For example, although super 
PACs may only advocate for—not directly contribute to—political 
candidates, those supporting presidential candidates in the 2012 
general election collected and spent more funds than the 
candidates themselves:150 Priorities USA Action spent $67.5 
million supporting President Barack Obama and liberal agendas, 
                                                                                                     
 147. See id. (“[Public companies] know those contributions might become 
public at some point, and no company that sells a product wants to risk [a 
substantial negative consumer reaction].”); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Mystery 
Firm is Election’s Top Corporate Donor at $5.3 Million, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov. 
5, 2012), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/mystery-firm-is-elections-top-
corpo.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (“‘Fortune 500 companies are the least 
likely to be the ones who will be out in front giving publicly,’ said Rick Hasen, a 
law professor at the University of California-Irvine. ‘They want to have 
influence over elections and elected officials, but they don't want to alienate 
customers.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 148. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Mystery Firm is Election’s Top Corporate 
Donor at $5.3 Million, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.open 
secrets.org/news/2012/11/mystery-firm-is-elections-top-corpo.html (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2012) (providing super PAC independent expenditure data) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 149. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PACs, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle= 
2012&chrt=V&type=S (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 150. See Peter Overby, As ‘Citizens United’ Turns 2, SuperPACs Draw 
Protests, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/20/14550 
0168/superpacs-celebrate-anniversary-of-citizens-united-case (last visited Nov. 
7, 2012) (quoting lawyer Ken Gross as stating that super PACs “are 
metastasizing” and are “almost bigger than the party committees”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alan Greenblatt, Big Money: Stuffing the 
Ballot Box?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 4, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/ 
05/29/153914560/big-money-and-the-ballot-box (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) 
(quoting Republican consultant Ed Goeas as stating, “‘Money is now at the end 
that's furthest away from the candidates and furthest away from the 
parties. . . . The money is with these other groups that are having more impact 
on the campaign than the campaign itself.’”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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and Restore Our Future spent $142.7 million supporting 
Republican nominee Mitt Romney and conservative agendas.151 
Possibly even more influential are the 501(c)(4) organizations, 
such as Crossroads GPS, co-founded by Karl Rove,152 and 
Americans for Prosperity, affiliated with the Koch brothers; these 
organizations can fund advertisements without disclosing how 
much they have spent until after the election and without ever 
disclosing their donors.153  
Although the laws regulating these groups’ expenditures and 
disclosures are not the direct result of Citizens United,154 some 
people view the case as converting the political race to a money 
standoff and “unleash[ing] a torrent of poorly disclosed, if 
disclosed at all, spending by the superwealthy”155 and “of money 
from businesses and the multimillionaires who run them, and as 
a result we are now seeing the corporate takeover of American 
politics”156—however inaccurate that perspective may be.157 Still, 
                                                                                                     
 151. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super 
PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ. 
php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (providing super 
PAC independent expenditure data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 152. Crossroads GPS also owns a super PAC, American Crossroads, which 
spent $104.7 million for conservative agendas during the 2012 election cycle. Id. 
 153. See S.V. Date, Hate the Latest Political Ads? Don’t Blame ‘Citizens 
United,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsall 
politics/2012/06/13/154943400/hate-the-latest-political-ads-dont-blame-citizens-
united (last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (describing the impact of “social welfare 
organizations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 154. Id. (stating that “[social welfare groups’] secret spending . . . is not due 
to the 2010 Citizens United decision”). 
 155. Frank James, Watchdogs Seek to Shed More Light on ‘Dark Money;’ It’s 
Not Easy, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsall 
politics/2012/08/02/157789593/watchdogs-seek-to-shed-more-light-on-dark-
money-its-not-easy (last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 156. Bai, supra note 146. 
 157. A critic might argue the significance of the fact that President Obama 
won the reelection with 30% of his contributions coming from “amounts less 
than $200 per person” and despite a huge Republican super PAC influence. Ctr. 
for Responsive Politics, 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for 
Responsive Politics Predicts, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.open 
secrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-election-spending-will-reach-6.html (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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the 2012 election cycle saw more outside158 spending than every 
other election cycle since 1990—combined;159 the $1,032,901,165-
total is almost 3.5 times the 2008 election cycle’s spending.160 
When adding in official spending, the people of the United States 
spent a total of approximately $6 billion on federal election 
campaigns for 2012.161  
Regardless of the actual factors driving the substantial 
increase in expenditures for this presidential election, many 
Americans are legitimately concerned that Citizens United 
overturned precedent that restricted corporate political speech 
rights, stating that such corporate speech is protected by the U.S. 
Constitution.162 One extreme generalization takes the form: “the 
Supreme Court held that corporations are ‘people,’” but they do 
not deserve the same rights as human people.163 This argument 
indicates a belief that the Court based its decision on an entity 
theory.164 Some commentators, and perhaps even Justice 
Stevens,165 might agree that the Court assumes corporations are 
                                                                                                     
 158. This statistic considers independent expenditures, electioneering 
communications, and communication costs, and it excludes party committees. 
Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, 
Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/out 
sidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 
Billion, Center for Responsive Politics Predicts, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 31, 
2012), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-election-spending-will-
reach-6.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (stating, one week before the election, 
that spending already reached $5.8 billion) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 162. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912–13 (2010) (overruling 
Austin because it “abandoned First Amendment principles” by restricting 
corporate political speech).  
 163. See, e.g., Mario, Tomorrow: Occupy Wall Street West, MITCHELL KAPOR 
FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://blog.mkf.org/2012/01/19/tomorrow-occupy-wall-
street-west/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (posting a flyer amounting Citizens 
United to this claim) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 164. See supra Part II.A (discussing entity theories). 
 165. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[Corporations’] ‘personhood’ often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are 
not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our 
Constitution was established.”). 
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entities—either real or artificial.166 In general, those viewing the 
Court as adopting an entity theory are suspicious of this theory 
(as they see the Court taking it);167 the critics see the Court’s 
conclusion in Citizens United as having adopting an entity theory 
without any reason for doing so.168 Some theorists have argued 
that the opinion supports either an entity or an aggregate theory, 
and they criticize the normative conclusions that they draw from 
the theory’s application in Citizens United.169 Professor David 
Millon, however, recognized the social cost of this seemingly 
endless170 debate:  
[E]fforts to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ have not succeeded. Indeed, 
such intellectual exercises may have stood in the way of 
careful examination of the truly urgent questions raised by 
corporate activity. Analysis of difficult questions of social 
policy have probably been hindered by assumptions about the 
distinctiveness of activity in the corporate form, whether the 
corporation is thought to be an entity or instead is an 
aggregation of people distinct from the rest of society.171 
Citizens United supports Professor Millon’s point because of the 
significant (and negative) public reaction.172 Perhaps the policy 
questions should be at the forefront of individuals’ minds because 
those are the real terms that affect corporate rights; even if the 
                                                                                                     
 166. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 41 (“The entire Citizens United 
opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are thus reflective of the real entity 
view. Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that 
created them and the shareholders that own them.”). 
 167. Editorial, The Court and Citizens United II, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, 
at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/the-supreme-
court-and-citizens-united-take-2.html?scp=1&sq=citizens%20united&st=cse (“It’s 
hard to see how the court’s conservative majority could contend that these 
expenditures pose no threat to American democracy.”). 
 168. See id. (arguing that the Court had no reason to rule broadly, had 
mistaken assumptions, and wrongly dismissed the likelihood of corruption).  
 169. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 41 (arguing that the Court used a 
real-entity theory); Padfield, supra note 8, at 225 (arguing that the Court used 
an aggregate theory); Kerr, supra note 145, at 314 n.28 (asserting the artificial-
entity theory in a Citizens United analysis). 
 170. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 3 (“[T]hroughout all of [the changes in 
the legal conception of the corporation], spanning two millennia, the same three 
theories of the corporation can be discerned.”). 
 171. David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2 
STANFORD AGORA 39, 58 (2001). 
 172. See supra Part III.C (discussing Citizens United’s public impact). 
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Supreme Court adopted an entity theory, no one ought to care 
about the metaphor when policy implications are in dispute.173 In 
fact, Citizens United may implicate some new policy 
considerations, particularly in the campaign finance context.174 
D. Legal Impact 
Citizens United might constrain courts or affect the public in 
unanticipated ways, which could bear on corporate rights. First, 
the Court upheld constitutional protection of corporate speech to 
the same extent that individual speech is protected under the 
First Amendment.175 By proclaiming this right to be facially 
constitutional instead of addressing the issue as-applied,176 the 
Court has limited its discretion. For example, corporations 
currently cannot contribute directly to candidates,177 but 
individuals may currently contribute up to $2,500 per federal 
candidate, per election cycle.178 Based on the reasoning in 
                                                                                                     
 173. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the difference between making 
metaphysical versus function claims). 
 174. See infra Part V (discussing policy arguments). 
 175. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (upholding 
constitutional protection for corporate speech). The speech right first attached to 
corporations in a previous case. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 784–85 (1978) (stating that corporations are entitled to protected speech). 
 176. See id. at 894 (“[I]t is necessary . . . to consider the [statute’s] facial 
validity.”). 
 177. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (prohibiting corporate monetary 
contributions to political campaigns); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 
(1976) (stating that individual contribution limits are constitutional because 
they “serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the 
electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual 
citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion”).  
 178. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2006) (limiting individual 
contributions), with 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b) (2012) (increasing by price index), and 
Price Index Adjustments for Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling 
Disclosure Threshold, 77 Fed. Reg. 9925-01 (Feb. 21, 2012) (setting the 2012-
election individual contribution limit at $2,500). To clarify the distinction 
between corporate funds and PAC funds, a corporation’s PAC may contribute to 
each candidate up to $5,000 of the funds that corporate members designate for 
that PAC, see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (limiting PAC contributions to federal 
candidates and their committees); corporations, however, cannot contribute 
corporate general treasury money, see Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 
Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (prohibiting 
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Citizens United that monetary restrictions burdening political 
speech are subject to strict scrutiny,179 and based on the Court’s 
rejection of the antidistortion rationale,180 the U.S. Supreme 
Court might strike down the ban on corporations contributing 
directly to candidates as impermissibly restricting political 
speech.181 Though a decision extending the protection to corporate 
contributions might affect legal discourse about public policy, this 
seems to be the extent of such a ruling’s collateral impact on 
corporate theory because further protecting the corporate right to 
speech through political contributions would most likely rely on 
the same reasoning as the Court used to permit corporate 
independent expenditures. Thus, a possible future decision to 
permit corporate contributions might necessarily follow from 
Citizens United.182 
Second, although the media has sometimes exaggerated or 
misinterpreted Citizens United,183 some legal implications of the 
                                                                                                     
corporate monetary contributions to political campaigns). 
 179. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (applying strict scrutiny to laws 
burdening political speech). 
 180. See id. at 913 (finding the antidistortion interest “unconvincing and 
insufficient”). 
 181. Interview with Jason Torchinsky, Partner, HoltzmanVogelJosefiak 
PLLC, in Lexington, Va. (Feb. 29, 2012).  
 182. Id. But see, e.g., United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 616 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (reversing a federal district court decision that applied Citizens 
United to ban corporate contributions); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, 
Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 880 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming a federal district 
court decision upholding a state’s ban on direct corporate contributions to 
candidates); Eugene Volokh, Constitutional to Ban Corporate Contributions to 
Candidates (as Opposed to Independent Expenditures), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(May 16, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/05/16/constitutional-to-ban-
corporate-contributions-to-candidates-as-opposed-to-independent-expenditures/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (arguing it is constitutional to ban corporate 
contributions to candidates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 183. See, e.g., Supreme Court OKs Corporate Campaign Contributions, PBS 
(Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june10/supreme 
court_01-21.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter PBS.ORG] (headlining, 
erroneously, that corporate contributions are constitutional, as opposed to 
independent expenditures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Stephen Colbert SuperPAC & Frank Lutz, Corporations Are People, COLBERT 
NATION (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-
videos/400559/october-24-2011/colbert-super-pac—corporations-are-people—frank-
luntz (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (attempting to make the idea that corporations 
are people appealing to the public) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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opinion might indeed have far-reaching effects on the public and 
on campaign finance reform. Groups forming under § 527 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, including PACs,184 may gather uncapped 
corporate and individual donations and use the funds for 
independent campaign expenditures.185 Since Citizens United, 
courts have had no discretion to limit these groups.186 Citizens 
United also laid the groundwork187 for a federal circuit court 
decision two months later, SpeechNow.org v. FEC,188 which led to 
the clear ability for individuals to form “super PACs” to make 
only independent expenditures.189 Super PACs have proliferated 
as a means to “raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, 
unions, associations and individuals, then spend unlimited sums 
to overtly advocate for or against political candidates.”190 Rather 
than focusing on the potential for public corporations’ 
overwhelming influence in the political sphere, perhaps the 
public ought to be more concerned with individual associations, 
unions, closely held companies, and other coordinating campaign 
spenders that can raise and spend unlimited funds.191  
                                                                                                     
 184. Bill de Blasio, Citizens United and the 2010 Midterm Elections, THE 
PUB. ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF N.Y. 8 (Dec. 2010), http://advocate.nyc.gov/files/ 
12-06-10CitizensUnitedReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (explaining 527 
groups after Citizens United) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 185. Id. at 3–5 (discussing the effect of Citizens United). 
 186. See id. at 4 (stating that the Court enables 527 organizations to solicit 
unlimited donations). 
 187. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The 
independence of independent expenditures was a central consideration in 
[Citizens United]. By definition, independent expenditures are not made in 
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate [or 
his committees or agents].” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 188. See id. at 698 (concluding that contribution limits cannot 
constitutionally be applied to individuals pooling money only to make unlimited 
independent expenditures). 
 189. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 
13, 2012), http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last 
visited Feb. 29, 2012) (explaining super PACs) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Interview with Jason Torchinsky, Partner, HoltzmanVogelJosefiak 
PLLC, in Lexington, Va. (Feb. 29, 2012) (suggesting that publicly held 
corporations are not the primary concern after Citizens United and 
SpeechNow.org). These groups “cannot coordinate with campaigns” and must 
disclose all expenditures frequently, allowing competing groups to track their 
2204 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2171 (2012) 
Third, Citizens United may have committed courts and 
legislatures to a broader conception of constitutionally protected 
speech than anticipated. For example, although the decision 
upheld disclosure requirements on independent expenditures,192 
social welfare organizations formed under § 501(c)(4) of the 
Internal Revenue Code can still accept unlimited anonymous 
donations and use the funds for electioneering expenditures,193 
and since 2010, corporations have been able to donate their funds 
to those organizations.194 By allowing unlimited independent 
expenditures and not protecting against loopholes such as the use 
of 501(c)(4) organizations, Citizens United opened the door for 
unlimited undisclosed corporate expenditures,195 and the courts 
will have no discretion within the Constitution to ban these 
expenditures if they become substantial.196 In addition, Citizens 
United seems to have little or no effect on restrictions on charity 
lobbying efforts.197  
Citizens United’s legal impact is thus significant in the 
context of electioneering, and the developments in this area of 
                                                                                                     
spending. Id.  
 192. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (finding 
disclosure requirements constitutional). 
 193. 501(c)(4)s may remain tax-exempt if the communications are “issue-
based,” but advertisements can still reflect particular candidates in a bad light. 
See Peter Overby, A Fine Line: Distinguishing Issue Ads From Advocacy, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (June 19, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/06/19/155325685/a-fine-
line-distinguishing-issue-ads-from-advocacy (last visited Aug. 23, 2012) 
(showing how an issue advertisement can walk the line of advocating the defeat 
of a candidate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 194. See Blasio, supra note 184, at 4 (explaining 501(c)(4)s after Citizens 
United). 
 195. See id. at 3 (“While the Court acknowledged the permissibility of 
disclosure requirements for political spending, the decision enabled many 
corporations to spend money on independent political broadcasts without 
disclosing the donors that fund their activities.”). 
 196. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892 (“[T]he Court cannot resolve this 
case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is 
central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”). 
 197. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights 
in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407, 426 (2011) (concluding 
that “Citizens United strongly suggests that the existing limits on lobbying by 
charities continue to be valid”). 
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law are deeply interrelated with the policy arguments regarding 
corporate rights.198 
IV. Corporate Theory After Citizens United 
As some legal scholars were ready to move on from the 
question of corporate personhood,199 the question became vastly 
more interesting to the public.200 Commentators have 
interpreted Citizens United as adopting the aggregate theory, 
the real-entity theory, the artificial-entity theory, or no theory of 
corporate rights.201 Courts do not consistently adopt one of these 
views over the others.202 Even various U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices have adopted, explicitly or implicitly, each of these three 
theories at some point—and in some cases, more than one theory 
in the same opinion.203 Given the inconsistent and seemingly 
incompatible application of theories propounded by legal scholars 
and courts alike, the public’s misunderstanding of Citizens 
                                                                                                     
 198. See infra Part IV.D (concluding that the real source of the corporate 
right in Citizens United is policy). 
 199. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 171, at 58 (arguing that we may be better 
off with a more appropriately focused debate). But see, e.g., Padfield, supra note 
8, at 223 & n.74 (noting Millon’s and Dewey’s respective arguments against the 
corporate theory debate and concluding that the debate is relevant to the 
question of the corporate role in society). 
 200.  See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Corporate Sponsorship Is Campaign Issue on 
Which Both Parties Can Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, at A15 (providing 
poll results and statements of political figures who oppose unlimited corporate 
campaign expenditure). 
 201. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 41 (arguing that the Court used a 
real-entity theory); Kerr, supra note 145, at 314 n.28 (asserting the artificial-
entity theory in a Citizens United analysis); Millon, supra note 171, at 56–57 
(discussing the modern relevance of entity or aggregate theories of corporate 
personhood); Padfield, supra note 8, at 225 (arguing that the Court used an 
aggregate theory). This Note does not discuss the many other theories that 
answer questions other than those concerning the nature or existence of the 
corporate form. See, e.g., Padfield, supra note 8, at 215 (discussing other 
prominent corporate theories). 
 202. See supra Part II.C (discussing the various positions courts have taken 
on the corporate form and corporate personhood). 
 203. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has 
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the 
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and 
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories). 
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United is not surprising. Moreover, the public is misguided about 
the source of the corporate speech right because the public relies 
on the media’s rendition of an already inadequate opinion.204   
A. The Public’s Misuse of “Person”  
Public attention to corporate rights, after Citizens United in 
particular, amplifies a main problem with theories of corporate 
personhood: the fallacy that metaphysical discussions about 
corporations can imply functional, legal conclusions.205  
The use of the phrase “corporations are people” to deduce 
personal corporate rights is a misclassification.206 Consider 
dividing descriptive language about corporations, taken in 
context, into three distinct sets: (1) metaphysical language, such 
as “corporations are entities” or “corporations have rights derived 
from their constituents,” which describes an ontological 
conception of what a corporation is;207 (2) functional language, 
such as “corporations provide limited shareholder liability” or 
“corporations are established by charter,” which describes what 
corporations are in real, legal, or practical terms;208 and 
(3) language that is neither metaphysical nor functional, such as 
normative or qualitative language. Focusing on the first two of 
these three sets, the phrase “corporate person” can have two 
different meanings. Metaphysically, it refers to a corporate 
ontology in the same way that corporate-essence theories attempt 
to represent corporations by using one of two metaphors—either 
as entities separate from their shareholders or as an aggregate of 
                                                                                                     
 204. See, e.g., PBS, supra note 183 (headlining an error that corporate 
contributions are constitutional, as opposed to independent expenditures—to 
which the anchors correctly refer). 
 205. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circularity problem with presuming 
an inherent truth about some corporate essence and then defining the essence 
by deriving traits from that essence).  
 206. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 660 (1926) (distinguishing the metaphysical from 
the pragmatic use of “person”). 
 207. See id. (providing “two radically different types of definitions,” one 
being “a definite metaphysical conception regarding the nature of things”). 
 208. See id. at 660−61 (providing a second type of definition “which proceeds 
in terms of consequences, . . . stated in terms of specific effects extrinsically 
wrought in other things”). 
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participants. Importantly, this language does not ascribe real 
traits to corporations, but rather allows us to speak about what a 
corporation should be, based on its ontology or essence. 
Functionally, “corporate person” defines a set of human rights 
that corporations are permitted to adopt if the issue arises, as if a 
court were saying, “Treat the corporation like a human in this 
context.”209 This language is used to establish that corporations 
actually have explicit, real rights when legislatures, courts, or 
charters assign such rights. 
Sometimes people confuse these two types of language in 
order to answer questions about what a corporation or corporate 
person is. For example, consider the two main branches of the 
corporate-rights dichotomy: artificial and natural. Both attempt 
to define what rights a corporation has to function within the law. 
But when the law does not state whether a corporation has a 
particular right, it may be tempting to ask the question, “What 
sort of thing is a corporation—one that ought to have this right, 
or one that ought not?” This crosses over into the metaphysical 
category because we are speaking about the essence of a 
corporation as a metaphor for something we can otherwise only 
explain to the extent the law provides details.  
Using language from one category in an attempt to draw 
conclusions in another would be a “category error,” as Gilbert 
Ryle defined the term in his philosophy of the human mind.210 In 
Ryle’s classic example of a category error, a foreigner visits a 
university, tours all the buildings and fields, sees the students 
and faculty, and then asks: “But where is the University?”211 Ryle 
explains that the foreigner asking the question commits a 
category error by inferring that the university exists as another 
“member of the class of which [the colleges, libraries, playing 
fields, etc.] are members.”212 Classifying the language in Ryle’s 
example into the three categories listed above makes the precise 
flaw obvious. The term “where” indicates that the speaker wishes 
to know a physical (functional) location. If he instead asked the 
                                                                                                     
 209. See id. at 661–62 (stating that calling corporations “persons” is a verbal 
matter and does not impute new behaviors). 
 210. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949) (explaining his term 
“category-mistake”). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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implicit question (“What is a university?”), the expected response 
would remain in the metaphysical category and commit no 
error.213  
Before applying the category-error notion to the corporate-
theory context, it might help to illustrate why committing a 
category error is problematic. Consider a mythical figure such as 
the stork that delivers babies. People construct this idea for when 
children ask the inevitable conception question and for the 
purpose of answering without being accountable for the 
implications of the true answer, as a child would perceive it. 
Parents can ascribe fictional traits to the stork: it can fly; it 
carries the baby in swaddling clothes to the proper doorstep; 
maybe even, it likes pickles. The stork continues to serve its real 
purpose, and parents are satisfied.  
But the stork is a fabrication by humans for a purpose. 
Realities persist: just as limited shareholder liability does not 
mean nobody pays a loss, babies are actually being conceived 
regardless of children’s naivety. Talking about the stork in the 
same construct as real beings or objects produces inconsistencies. 
A husband who tells his wife, “Honey, ask the stork if he wants 
more pickles,” will leave the wife bewildered; it puts the stork in 
the “existing” category when it should be in the “non-existing” 
category. Likewise, discourse about corporations on a 
metaphysical level using functional language (where the legal 
world seems to operate) commits a category error.214 The only 
way we can consistently speak about what corporations ought to 
be is on the metaphysical level, but we can speak about what 
corporations can actually, legally do on the functional level.215  
Once one spouse commits the error by talking about the stork 
in functional and metaphysical terms simultaneously, the other 
spouse rightly questions whether the stork is overstepping its 
purpose; no partner wants to be replaced by a mythical stork. 
Returning to the logical flaw in reasoning, the phrase “ask the 
stork if he wants more pickles” presumes there exists a truth-
                                                                                                     
 213. See id. (dissecting the university example). 
 214. See id. at 16 (explaining category mistakes). 
 215. See Dewey, supra note 206, at 660 (describing two different types of 
definitions: metaphysical regarding the nature of things and pragmatic 
regarding consequences). 
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value about whether he does.216 But the answer to the question is 
derived from the parents, not the stork; there is no answer until 
the parents make it up. Likewise, after Citizens United, the 
public’s fear that corporations are people in the metaphysical 
sense, deriving rights from the person mold it attempts to fill, 
illuminates the real problem at issue: the corporate right to free 
speech via independent expenditures does not derive from 
corporate personhood.217  
When criticizing Citizens United, the public interprets the 
Court as speaking about the essence of a corporation, which 
belongs in the metaphysical category.218 In fact, Justice Kennedy 
uses terms that describe corporate constituents or qualities in 
themselves, which belong in the functional category.219 For a 
simple example, “Citizens United wanted to make [the film] 
available . . . . It feared, however, that both the film and the ads 
would be [banned].”220 Most people would recognize that these 
personal verbs are only being used in the functional sense; it is 
hard to imagine this language as an indication that corporations 
literally and naturally are capable of having desires or fears.  
The problem with using theories to derive corporate traits 
arises with the idea that corporations have an essence from 
which we can deduce corporate rights.221 In 1926, John Dewey 
distinguished the corporate body as a mere right-and-duty-
bearing unit from the corporate body as having a nature such 
that rights can be ascribed to it.222 He rejects the notion that even 
                                                                                                     
 216. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circularity of deducing 
characteristics that only exist if fabricated).  
 217. See supra Part II.B (concluding that deducing rights from corporate 
personhood begs the question). 
 218. See, e.g., David Kairys, Money Isn’t Speech and Corporations Aren’t 
People, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2010, 9:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
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with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 219. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010) (using 
personal language). 
 220. Id. (emphasis added). 
 221. See Dewey, supra note 206, at 660 (arguing that ordinary connotations 
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 222. See id. at 658–59 (2010) (discussing whether we assume corporations 
have a nature).  
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“right-and-duty-bearing unit[s] should have a character of [their] 
own”223 by asserting that implicit theories in the minds of jurists, 
such as the aggregate and entity theories, do not vest in 
jurisprudence without “confusion, conflict and uncertainty.”224 
Dewey exposes the error of packing the term “person” with 
extraneous uses of the word, such as psychological or 
philosophical uses; “person” is meant for the limited use with 
which courts or legislators explicitly dictate.225  
Although the public might misunderstand Citizens United’s 
use of person, the opinion’s use is precisely to give constitutional 
protection to corporations to the same extent as it applies to 
individuals.226 Indeed, if the courts and legislatures could 
physically list every manifestation of personal speech rights and 
then map that list onto corporations, the debate would not 
concern corporate personhood but rather purely normative claims 
about whether policy supports a corporation’s having those 
rights. “Person” is a mere convenience to answer questions about 
corporate rights and duties, and deducing corporate rights from 
some corporate essence is a semantic error—a category error from 
conflating the metaphysical with the functional.227 
B. Looking for Theoretical Language in Citizens United  
1. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion 
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
avoids committing a category error because he does not deduce 
the corporate right from the essence of a corporate person. 
Instead, he begins with general language about a speaker’s rights 
without establishing first whether a corporation qualifies as a 
speaker: “the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower 
                                                                                                     
 223. Id. at 660. 
 224. Id.  
 225. See id. at 655–56 (arguing that the term “person” in the legal sense is 
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 226. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“First 
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 227. See HART, supra note 60, at 42–43 (explaining the circularity in 
deducing corporate characteristics from a corporate form). 
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ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to 
the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”228 Further, 
“[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use 
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened 
self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”229 Next, 
Justice Kennedy finds corporations’ right of free speech: “The 
Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to 
corporations.”230 He cites this sentence to twenty-one cases that 
support similar claims based on a chain of precedent tracing back 
to the single 1886 case, which declares the corporate right 
without justification.231 Justice Kennedy follows suit by providing 
only this one sentence to explain the extension of that right to 
corporations.232 From that right, Justice Kennedy immediately 
extends the protection to political speech, and then to the primary 
issue of independent expenditures, never returning to the 
application of personal rights to corporations.233  
In the following sections of the opinion, Justice Kennedy 
addresses and rejects the arguments that the government has 
sufficient interest in preventing corruption (or its appearance),234 
in preventing a distortion based on the speaker’s wealth,235 and in 
protecting shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate 
speech, concluding that none of those arguments adequately 
protect a valid constitutional right of speech.236 He specifically 
applies each of these conclusions to corporations, stating that 
Buckley and Bellotti “could not have been clearer” that “the 
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the 
speaker’s corporate identity”237 and rejecting the “post-Austin line 
                                                                                                     
 228. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892.  
 229. Id. at 898. 
 230. Id. at 899.  
 231. See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 66–67 (discussing how Santa Clara was 
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[of cases] that permits [corporate-based restrictions].”238 Indeed, 
in Bellotti, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the need to stick 
to constitutional interpretation, as opposed to corporate theory: 
“The proper question therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’ 
First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive 
with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be 
whether [the statute] abridges expression that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect.”239  
Justice Kennedy could only be construed to make statements 
about the corporate essence or corporate rights in two places: 
First, he states that “[c]orporations, like individuals, do not have 
monolithic views. On certain topics corporations may possess 
valuable expertise . . . .”240 This commits no category error; while 
the former sentence seems to be metaphysical, it does not infer 
any legal conclusions based on that claim. The latter sentence 
does not definitively assert any right or trait. Second, Justice 
Kennedy states: “[W]ealthy individuals and unincorporated 
associations can spend unlimited amounts on independent 
expenditures. Yet certain disfavored associations of citizens—
those that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for 
engaging in the same political speech.”241 In context, Justice 
Kennedy is making the point that wealthy individuals are 
sometimes as influential as corporations and that corporations 
should be treated as other associations of citizens. This too seems 
purely functional because Justice Kennedy already asserted that 
corporations are treated as persons for speech rights, so this only 
asserts rights already derived from legal precedent—it does not 
imagine new rights that ought to attach to the corporate citizen 
due to its form or essence. Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s language 
appears clear of subscription to any theory for purposes of 
improperly deriving corporate rights. 
Some commentators, however, interpret Justice Kennedy’s 
language as suggesting the aggregate theory, referring to the 
majority’s statements about banning “‘the political speech of 
                                                                                                     
 238. Id. at 903. 
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 240. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912 (2010). 
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millions of associations of citizens’”242 and penalizing “‘certain 
disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the 
corporate form.’”243 One scholar asserts, “[t]he majority viewed 
the corporation as fundamentally little more than an association 
of citizens.”244 Some of the Court’s claims, however, are trivially 
true by virtue of the corporate function in society, such as saying 
a corporation is an association of individuals.245 This does not 
reflect any metaphysical claim about the essence of a corporation 
from which we can deduce rights.246 To read the opinion as 
asserting that the corporation is an aggregate retaining the 
rights of its constituents is problematic: on one hand, if it inherits 
all of its constituents’ rights, contradictions will arise for those 
rights a corporation has been said not to possess, such as the 
right to swear an oath; on the other hand, if the aggregate only 
gleans some of the personhood rights, the court will still have to 
determine which rights it retains, which begs the question—it 
retains precisely those rights that the Court stipulates.247 The 
only sense in which the opinion could properly be advocating the 
aggregate theory, then, is in the metaphorical sense, merely to 
discuss the corporation, not to deduce functional rights.  
Professor Avi-Yonah argues that the majority’s language can 
only indicate a real-entity view.248 He arrives at this conclusion 
by process of elimination among the aggregate and entity 
theories, and he uses Justice Kennedy’s statement that “the ban 
on corporate speech was not alleviated by the fact that a PAC 
organized and controlled by the same corporation could speak 
freely because ‘[a] PAC is a separate association from the 
                                                                                                     
 242. Padfield, supra note 8, at 224 n.82 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
at 906–07). 
 243. Id. (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908). 
 244. Id. at 224. 
 245. For example, if several individuals incorporate their business and hang 
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individuals—under any theory. 
 246. See HART, supra note 60, at 42–43 (“Under what conditions do we refer 
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conditions do we adopt instead unifying phrases extended by analogy from 
individuals?” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 247. See id. (explaining the circularity in deducing corporate characteristics 
from a corporate form). 
 248. Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 39.  
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corporation.’”249 First, Professor Avi-Yonah asserts that Justice 
Kennedy does not advocate the aggregate theory because “under 
the aggregate view both the corporation and the PAC are owned 
by the same ultimate shareholders,” so they could not both be 
equivalent with their parts if they are “‘separate 
association[s].’”250 Second, Professor Avi-Yonah tackles the 
artificial–real entity distinction (the corporate-rights dichotomy) 
to narrow down his interpretation that Justice Kennedy takes an 
entity position.251 He rejects that Justice Kennedy assumes an 
artificial-entity view, which posits that the corporation is an 
entity with rights to the extent the state grants them.252 This 
theory, Professor Avi-Yonah claims, is inconsistent with Justice 
Kennedy’s statement about a PAC being separate from the 
corporation because “both the PAC and the corporation are 
created by the same state” and controlled by the same 
corporation, so would presumably be the same association of 
people.253   
Professor Avi-Yonah presumes he is left with only the real-
entity theory, which states that corporations are entities consisting 
of shareholders with separate management and corporate rights 
beyond what the legislature prescribes.254 He mentions John 
Dewey’s argument that the aggregate and entity theories are 
circular and “could be deployed to suit any purpose.” Professor Avi-
Yonah then briefly considers how Dewey’s argument “dismisses as 
irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and 
real entity views of the corporation.”255 He acknowledges the 
credibility of this view but then promptly moves on, stating that, 
“As a practical matter, . . . the real entity view predominated for 
                                                                                                     
 249. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
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 250. Id. (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897). 
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large, publicly traded corporations.”256 Rather than rejecting 
Dewey’s view, therefore, he merely observes that its popularity 
faded.257 In sum, Professor Avi-Yonah rejects that Justice Kennedy 
aligns with the aggregate or artificial-entity theories but provides 
no direct language in support of his claim that Justice Kennedy 
espouses a real-entity theory.258 This lack of affirmative foundation 
for the real-entity theory in Citizens United does not pair well with 
Professor Avi-Yonah’s willingness to overlook Dewey’s argument 
that none of the three theories are on point. To agree with 
Professor Avi-Yonah, either we are left to our own devices to reject 
Dewey’s argument or we must defer to general legal scholars’ 
silence in reaction to Dewey’s theory, which seems to have left 
them scratching their heads until enough time passed to sweep his 
point under the rug as too devastating to centuries of corporate-
law theories.259  
In fact, Dewey’s point is not so devastating. Professor Avi-
Yonah seems to recognize that his argument may have contributed 
to a more practical (functional) use of the theories, rather than 
theoretical (metaphorical).260 Still, as long as scholars attempt to 
use metaphor-based theories (such as the corporate-essence 
theories) to answer questions about corporations’ functional, real 
rights, Dewey’s point remains cogent: “‘person’ signifies what law 
makes it signify.”261 A court stating that “corporations are people” 
under one law only means to qualify people to include 
corporations—it does not add a trait to the corporate form labeling 
it as a person. 
In other cases, the Court has not been so careful,262 and the 
members of the public frequently commit this error.263 Justice 
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Kennedy, it seems, either has inadvertently avoided a category 
error by limiting his justification of the corporate person to 
essentially one sentence (“The Court has recognized that First 
Amendment protection extends to corporations.”)264 or, more likely, 
has properly stayed within the narrow lines of federal jurisdiction 
by carefully choosing his language to avoid expanding the 
corporate essence based on a mere image of what a corporation 
ought to be.265 Despite his tiptoeing around corporate law, 
however, he is not off the hook for the confusion surrounding 
Citizens United.266 
2. Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Scalia offers more debatable language in his 
concurring opinion. He finds the majority opinion consistent with 
the Framers’ intent to constitutionalize free speech for individual 
Americans:  
All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of 
individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar 
bears. But the individual person’s right to speak includes the 
right to speak in association with other individual persons . . . . 
It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have 
associated in a common cause, giving the leadership of the 
[group] the right to speak on their behalf . . . . [A corporation] 
cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground 
that it is not “an individual American.”267 
To some this may seem like language characteristic of the 
aggregate view,268 but Professor Avi-Yonah correctly presumes 
                                                                                                     
distinct legal entity.”). 
 263. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circularity problem with presuming 
an inherent truth about some corporate essence and then defining the essence 
by deriving traits from that essence).  
 264. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).  
 265. See id. at 886–917 (defending the decision on grounds of constitutional 
analysis, stare decisis, and policy). 
 266. See infra Part V.A (criticizing the opinion for its lack of a clear 
rationale). 
 267. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44 (describing the aggregate 
theory as viewing the corporate essence based on an aggregation of its 
shareholders and other participants).  
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that Justice Scalia means “corporate management working 
together as an association of persons” for a common cause.269 In 
fact, Justice Scalia’s language, such as referring to the 
corporation as a “legal entity,”270 is consistent with Professor Avi-
Yonah’s interpretation that Justice Scalia might adopt a real-
entity theory,271 which would be proper so long as Justice Scalia 
does not transgress into metaphysical notions about corporate 
nature.  
Most telling, however, of Justice Scalia’s use of the entity 
conception of a corporation is his apparent assumption that the 
First Amendment applies to corporations insofar as it does not 
exclude them outright.272 Because Justice Scalia essentially 
presumes corporations have the same First Amendment speech 
rights that people have, he provides no justification for this 
premise and we are left to wonder if he grounded it in a right 
derived from the corporate essence or in actual law. If the right 
comes from his notion of the corporate entity, this is an 
impermissible category error: obviously an association of people 
cannot have all of the same rights as the individuals that make it 
up, such as the right to vote in an election, but the question 
“Which rights does it derive from its individuals?” cannot be 
answered with “The same rights that its individuals are entitled 
to.” Conversely, if Justice Scalia implicitly justified the right 
using law, he would have had to rely on precedent that interprets 
the First Amendment to apply to corporations. This presents its 
own problems, as Part II.C explains: all of the precedent 
supporting corporate personal constitutional rights traces back to 
                                                                                                     
 269. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 40 (arguing that Scalia might 
appear to adopt the aggregate view, but “what Scalia meant was presumably 
corporate management working together as an association of persons”). 
 270. Justice Scalia actually uses the term “artificial legal entity,” but his use 
of the adjective artificial must not be confused with the term used in this Note, 
which refers to the corporation as a mere creature of the law, whose only rights 
are those conferred by the state. See supra note 38 and accompanying text 
(defining the artificial-entity theory). Justice Scalia seems to use artificial to 
mean that the legal entity is not a tangible, visible thing but merely one 
constructed for thinking about the concept of a corporation. 
 271. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 39–40 (arguing that Justice Scalia 
adopts the real-entity view).  
 272. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 926 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (finding no support for “the proposition that the First Amendment 
excludes conduct of artificial legal entities from the scope of its protection”). 
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one sentence in one 1886 case, which simply declares the right 
without any discussion.273 
3. Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Stevens provides ample language analyzing corporate 
nature. For example, he argues that “speech can be regulated 
differentially on account of the speaker’s identity”274 and that this 
applies especially to corporations because they raise special 
concerns, such as the potential for corruptive influence.275 By 
concluding this criticism with a list of other avenues for 
expressing corporate speech, Justice Stevens seems to adopt an 
entity viewpoint and assume rights based on that notion.276 He 
presumes that the corporations are just a “different class[] of 
speakers,”277 who are “not natural persons, much less members of 
our political community.”278 Justice Stevens also asserts that the 
Framers “held very different views about the nature of the First 
Amendment right and the role of corporations in society”279—that 
“it was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in 
mind”280 and that “‘[a] corporation [was thought of as] an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
the law[,] . . . possess[ing] only those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it.’”281 In particular, he asserts that:  
                                                                                                     
 273. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (tracing the precedent 
back to an unsubstantiated opinion declaring that corporations are people 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 274. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 275. See id. at 947 (“[L]egislatures are entitled to decide that the special 
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation 
in an electoral context.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 276. See id. at 943 (“The laws upheld in Austin and McConnell leave open 
many additional avenues for corporations’ political speech.”). 
 277. Id. at 946. 
 278. Id. at 947. 
 279. Id. at 949. 
 280. Id. at 950. 
 281. Id. (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 
518, 636 (1819)) (providing, within a citation, language of an 1819 case to 
represent views of the Framers). 
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[W]hereas we have no evidence to support the notion that the 
Framers would have wanted corporations to have the same 
rights as natural persons in the electoral context, we have 
ample evidence to suggest that they would have been appalled 
by the evidence of corruption that Congress unearthed in 
developing BCRA and that the Court today discounts to 
irrelevance.282 
Justice Stevens explains that “corporations are different from 
human beings” for many reasons, including their properties of 
limited liability for owners and management, perpetual life, 
separation of ownership and control, potential for foreign control, 
an available treasury that reflects economically motivated 
decisions of investors and customers, and a lack of beliefs, 
feelings, thoughts, and desires.283 “[T]heir ‘personhood’ often 
serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves 
members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our 
Constitution was established.”284 He continues to evaluate “‘who’ 
is even speaking when a business corporation places an 
advertisement,”—not the customers, employees, or shareholders, 
leaving possibly a few managers who must sometimes overlook 
even their own personal convictions regarding the message.285 
When a four-Justice dissent continuously criticizes “[t]he 
majority’s unwillingness to distinguish between corporations and 
humans,”286 the public seems more justified in believing that 
Citizens United stands for the claim that corporations are people. 
In addition to explicit language, Justice Stevens introduces 
arguments that rely on an understanding of the majority as 
adopting an entity viewpoint. For example, he criticizes that the 
majority considers the statute a categorical ban on speech, when 
actually “every shareholder of every corporation remains entirely 
free . . . to do however much electioneering she pleases outside of 
the corporate form.”287 This criticism indicates that Justice 
Stevens views the majority opinion as adopting an entity theory 
and discerning rights from that notion, but he stops short of 
                                                                                                     
 282. Id. at 963. 
 283. Id. at 971. 
 284. Id. at 972. 
 285. Id.  
 286. Id. at 975. 
 287. Id. at 943. 
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identifying the problem with deducing rights from this 
metaphorical corporate entity. Justice Stevens argues that the 
majority “beg[s] the question what types of corporate spending 
are constitutionally protected and to what extent.”288 Although 
Justice Stevens criticizes this as circular,289 the inference (and 
thus the circularity) cuts the other way: the Court is charged with 
saying what types of corporate spending are constitutional when 
a statute poses the question.290  
In sum, no Citizens United Justices attempt to deny that 
corporations have some personal constitutional rights under the 
First Amendment. Justices Kennedy (for the majority), Scalia 
(concurring), and Stevens (for the dissent) each provide 
justification for the corporate right to political speech in one of 
two ways: they either improperly derive the right from a mirage 
of what they believe a corporation is or ought to be, or else they 
base the right on unexplained precedent. Which of the two 
justifications each Justice chooses is unclear. 
C. What Citizens United Makes Clear 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not been careful to provide the 
public with a consistent image of the corporate form.291 In fact, 
the Court’s previous manifestations of the error, sometimes 
deriving functional rights from metaphysical notions about 
inherent corporate form, have tainted the public’s impression of 
the source of corporate rights.292 Therefore, the reaction to 
Citizens United makes clear that, due to the Court’s cursory 
                                                                                                     
 288. Id. at 934. 
 289. Id. at 930 (“The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to 
natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate 
to justify the Court’s disposition of this case.”). 
 290. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1388 (explaining, under Hart’s position, 
that “we make the rules, and it is only by reference to those rules that the 
corporation can be said to ‘be’ anything at all” (citations omitted)). 
 291. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has 
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the 
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and 
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories).  
 292. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (using the aggregate 
view to justify personal due process protection).  
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analysis, the public has a misguided notion of the source of the 
political speech right.  
The inference the public often draws has two interrelated 
flaws, the first logical and the second semantic. First, the 
reasoning is backwards: the public interprets Citizens United as 
using the premise “corporations are people” to deduce traits, but 
that should be the conclusion—and only in the particular 
instances when the law treats corporations as persons. Hart 
identified this error in his claim that defining a corporation by 
inherent rights is circular.293 The corporation only has 
characteristics to the extent that courts and legislatures stipulate 
them.294 The public would be marginally better off by saying, 
“Corporations have the same speech rights as people, so 
corporations are people,” but the overly broad conclusion does not 
follow.295 In a constitutional analysis of personal rights, then, the 
only proper way to claim that “corporations are people” is in 
response to the question “What is the extent of corporate rights 
pursuant to this particular constitutional provision?” Saying 
“corporations are people” merely means corporations have the 
same set of rights as people under the law in question; it is a 
language tool to understand what law applies. Theorists and even 
courts join the general public in often overlooking Hart’s point 
when speaking about corporate personhood,296 but his point 
follows clearly from the fact that corporations exist by virtue of 
statutory law, judicial interpretation, and human participation. 
The Citizens United Justices fail to eradicate this misconception, 
and they possibly even commit the mistake themselves by 
assuming what they seek to prove: that corporations are entitled 
to First Amendment protection to the same extent as 
individuals.297 
                                                                                                     
 293. See HART, supra note 60, at 42–43 (explaining the circularity in 
deducing corporate characteristics from a corporate form). 
 294. See id. (explaining that corporations only have traits explicitly granted 
by law). 
 295. Similarly, Hart uses the example of a trick in a card game to show how 
attempting to define it in one context leads to inconsistencies when that 
definition is “substituted for [the word trick] whenever it is used.” Id. at 33. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 296. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circularity of using theories to 
deduce functional rights). 
 297. See supra Part IV.B (providing theoretical hints from each Justice’s 
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Second, the inference commits a category error by using 
functional language about a particular corporate right to infer a 
metaphysical claim about the essence of corporations.298 John 
Dewey explained that person is merely a term used for 
convenience to say that, with respect to this particular issue, all 
the rights of a person apply.299 Dewey would argue that person is 
merely meant for the functional sense, and using it in the 
metaphysical sense would be improper and would pack it full of 
the real implications that come along with the word.300 The 
particular category error evident in the public’s response to 
Citizens United makes the same move by using functional 
language to draw a metaphysical conclusion about corporations. 
Again, the Citizens United Justices—more likely in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions—possibly commit this error 
themselves by failing to justify the corporate right to speech in 
functional terms and, instead, deducing certain rights from a 
vague conception of corporations.301 
Each flaw—the logical and the semantic—produces the same 
consequence: corporate personhood cannot be the source of 
corporate rights and duties.  
D. The Real Source of the Corporate Right in Citizens United 
Part of the reason the public misunderstands Citizens United 
as deriving the corporate speech right from corporate personhood 
is that the opinion itself does not adequately explain how 
corporations are endowed with the right. Whereas the public 
itself typically has brought about many corporate rights by virtue 
of its influence in legislatures, the Supreme Court confuses the 
public by establishing a corporate right without explaining the 
source. Further, the public needs to know the source in order to 
scrutinize the Court; after all, Citizens United overturned a 
                                                                                                     
language). 
 298. See RYLE, supra note 210, at 16 (explaining category mistakes). 
 299. See Dewey, supra note 206, at 655 (arguing that “person” signifies only 
what the law makes it signify). 
 300. See id. at 660 (differentiating the two uses). 
 301. See supra Part IV.B (providing theoretical hints from each Justice’s 
language). 
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statute on constitutional grounds, rendering the decision largely 
immune from future legislative, and thus public, interference. If 
the corporate personal speech right did not arise from the 
corporate essence, what is the source?  
Obvious sources include statutes or public policy.302 Or 
perhaps courts in the past have merely fabricated the right and 
now courts blindly perpetuate it.303 The question is, at the 
moment a right attaches, what is its justification? This question 
avoids a category error because it is functional, not metaphysical: 
the justification (if one exists) must be specific and with a legal or 
social purpose—not abstract or with merely a theoretical purpose. 
Recall the example of the stork:304 The stork is just a metaphor to 
ease discussion; it cannot actually fly because it does not exist. 
The parents can argue about whether the stork should 
theoretically be able to fly, but they know it is their discretion—
they do not begrudgingly accept some truth that all imaginary 
storks must fly. In contrast, the reality is that babies are 
conceived and born; the physical world restricts what they can do, 
and parents try to keep them in line.  
Hiding behind a metaphor allows us to imagine that 
corporations are exactly what we want them to be in any given 
circumstance, regardless of contradictions this might pose in 
reality. We created corporations to be just like people in some 
ways, but not like people in other ways—often aiming to obtain 
the best of both worlds, but we forget the inconsistencies a 
piecemeal nature inevitably brings.305 When it comes to 
addressing these inconsistencies or questions about corporate 
rights, only two boundaries apply: corporations’ physical potential 
to do certain humanlike activities and the rules that we set.  
At issue in Citizens United is whether corporations should be 
permitted to speak, in the form of political independent 
                                                                                                     
 302. See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (refusing to 
find a corporate right of personal privacy when the statute says “person” instead 
of “personal”). 
 303. See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D. 
Cal. 1883) (stating, without support, that a corporate personal right exists). 
 304. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the “stork” example). 
 305. For example, with limited liability, we stand to earn huge rewards if 
the business prevails, but the potential for devastating loss is limited to our 
investment; if that is exhausted, other members of society foot the bill.  
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expenditures, to the extent that persons are permitted to do so. 
While the public sees this decision as the Court bestowing a 
major liberty on corporations, they do not see why or how; the 
Court is virtually silent. The Court’s task is to justify the decision 
and explain—even to the public—why it opines as it does.306 This 
is the most important sense in which the Court errs in Citizens 
United—not by its improperly deducing the right from a 
metaphysical corporate essence but in failing to explain the 
actual source of the right. The public is left to analyze the 
decision. 
Looking at the moment the Court attaches the personal right 
of speech to corporations, what must the source be? First, the 
Court infers the corporate speech right by stating that “First 
Amendment protection extends to corporations” and citing plenty 
of cases.307 Next the Court considers public policy arguments, 
such as whether the corporate influence in the political sphere 
might corrupt officials or distort the picture of public opinion.308 
Looking to its predecessor cases, too, indicates public policy 
justifications.309 As it appears from the decision, which lacks any 
explanation for why this personal right extends to corporations, 
Citizens United seems to ground the right in public policy. This 
presents an irony: the public frames its dissatisfaction around the 
corporate-rights debate, but as Professor Millon warned, the 
unnecessary discourse of the corporate-rights debate pushes 
important policy considerations aside.310 What makes Citizens 
United important is that the source of the right actually is the 
party who is most confused about the source of the right—the 
public. Because the public’s traditional avenue to implement 
preferred policy into law (through the legislatures) has been 
removed by this Constitution-based decision, criticizing the Court 
                                                                                                     
 306. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions As Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 
1463 (1995) (discussing the idea that the Supreme Court ought to explain its 
conclusions to the public). 
 307. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010).  
 308. See, e.g., id. at 904–05 (considering the antidistortion rationale).  
 309. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 33–41 (looking at cases preceding 
Citizens United). 
 310. See Millon, supra note 171, at 58 (stating that theoretical discussions 
may detract from the focus on important policy considerations). 
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for finding a corporate personal right is not the most useful 
discourse.  
V. Proper Grounds for Criticizing Citizens United 
Per the foregoing discussion, one could criticize the opinion 
by saying that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices rely on 
metaphysical language to make a functional claim.311 The 
majority opinion in Citizens United, however, seems to cleanly 
remain in the functional category, and even the concurring 
opinions make no substantial logical or semantic errors.312 If the 
public views the opinion as not deducing rights from a corporate 
essence, as this Note suggests it should, our society might still 
benefit from a critical look at the opinion. 
A. Attacking the Court’s View of Policy 
One proper form of criticism would be that the Court 
inadequately defended the policy rationale. The public’s negative 
reaction to the opinion indicates that the Court, in relying on 
public policy as the source of the corporate right, might have 
ruled improperly by finding no sufficient government interest in 
policy concerns.313 Apparently from the language of the majority 
and concurring opinions and from the public’s reaction, the only 
policy issues with any steam are the antidistortion rationale and 
the anticorruption rationale.314  
                                                                                                     
 311. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority uses a theory as a basis for the right, and 
that the theory is improper). 
 312. See supra Part IV.A (looking at the Justices’ language). 
 313. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/ 
22scotus.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (quoting President 
Obama as denoting Citizens United “a major victory for big oil, Wall Street 
banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that 
marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of 
everyday Americans”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 314. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (dismissing the shareholder 
interest and foreign national arguments with little discussion and on several 
grounds). 
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With respect to the antidistortion rationale, the decision did 
not turn on whether there was a real risk of “an unfair advantage 
in the political marketplace by using resources amassed in the 
economic marketplace,”315 but rather on whether the government 
had a compelling interest in this protection.316 The grounds for 
reviving this issue would be the Court’s lack of due consideration 
for the effect of distortion. The Court relies only on Buckley to 
support a rigid claim that the government never has an interest 
in this regard.317 But if corporate law has its basis in utilitarian 
concerns,318 the public’s overwhelming dissatisfaction might be a 
sign that the government does have an interest in permitting 
checks on corporate power,319 even if it means overturning 
precedent or allowing restrictions on political speech.320 
In considering the anticorruption rationale, the Court has 
rejected that corporate independent expenditures give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.321 In early 2012, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in a one-paragraph per curiam decision,322 
reversed a Montana Supreme Court ruling that upheld a statute 
restricting corporate political expenditures despite Citizens 
United and despite the fact that it restricted corporate speech.323 
                                                                                                     
 315. Id. at 904 (citation omitted). 
 316. See id. (“Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an 
interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence 
the outcome of elections.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 317. Id. at 904–05 (stating that the government does not have an interest in 
equalizing abilities to influence elections and that wealth is not sufficient to 
limit political speech). 
 318. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1387 (stating that utilitarianism is 
“corporate law’s implicit moral theory”). 
 319. See generally Hasen, supra note 124 (discussing how the antidistortion 
rationale was improperly orphaned). 
 320. See, e.g., Editorial, Montana Takes on Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/opinion/montanas-challenge-to-
citizens-united.html?_r=1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (discussing the aims of a 
case that petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit Citizens United) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 321. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (finding the 
anticorruption interest insufficient to merit the restrictions on speech). 
 322. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) 
(stating that the “holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law”).  
 323. See id. (reversing the judgment that upheld a law contrary to the 
Citizens United holding). 
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The Montana court found a compelling state interest in 
“preserving the integrity of its electoral process.”324 The U.S. 
Supreme Court initially stayed the decision pending a timely 
filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari.325 In 
an order written February 17, 2012, Justice Ginsburg stated: 
Montana’s experience, and experience elsewhere since this 
Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Comm’n, make it exceedingly difficult to maintain that 
independent expenditures by corporations “do not give rise 
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” A petition for 
certiorari will give the Court an opportunity to consider 
whether, in light of the huge sums currently deployed to 
buy candidates’ allegiance, Citizens United should continue 
to hold sway. Because lower courts are bound to follow this 
Court’s decisions until they are withdrawn or modified, 
however, I vote to grant the stay.326 
An anticorruption argument would need to refute the Citizens 
United finding that “independent expenditures, including those 
made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”327 Then, the government would have 
to prove its interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or 
the appearance of it, but this may be a slighter burden than for 
the antidistortion rationale.328 Indeed, the Court draws the 
measure of interest from Buckley, which upheld limits on 
direct contributions on anticorruption grounds.329  
The Montana Supreme Court proceeded on other grounds, 
holding that a statute regulating independent corporate 
expenditures did not violate the corporation’s speech rights and,  
                                                                                                     
 324. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 2011 MT 328, ¶ 38, 363 
Mont. 220, 236, 271 P.3d 1, 11 (2011). 
 325. See Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11a762.htm 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (providing the U.S. Supreme Court docket) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 326. See Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/021712zr1.pdf (providing the 
U.S. Supreme Court order pending the case (citations omitted)). 
 327. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010). 
 328. See id. at 908 (explaining the government’s interest in preventing quid 
pro quo corruption).  
 329. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 63 (1976) (upholding contribution limits). 
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even if it did, satisfied a compelling state interest in preserving 
the integrity of the electoral process.330 Regardless of its reversal 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, Western Tradition and other 
cases331 blatantly refuting Citizens United might indicate a need 
to limit corporate speech via independent expenditures on public 
policy grounds. From here, perhaps a future Court of a different 
composition or a constitutional amendment, however unlikely, 
would serve to protect the public’s concerns. 
B. Attacking the Court’s Application of Precedent 
Another proper form of criticism would be that the Court 
departed from, or misinterpreted, precedent.332 It seems virtually 
impossible for the Court to properly interpret precedent when the 
Court has never consistently subscribed to one corporate-rights 
theory.333 One can criticize the court’s application of different 
metaphors in various corporate-rights cases.334 With respect to 
Citizens United, one can use this inconsistency to show that the 
Court has not properly applied precedent because the precedent 
itself lacked steady footing.335 Alternatively, one can attack the 
precedent underlying the decision for its use of metaphysical 
language. This analysis would likely involve a review of the 
                                                                                                     
 330. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 2011 MT 328, ¶ 48, 363 
Mont. 220, 240, 271 P.3d 1, 13 (2011) (stating that when “applying the 
principles enunciated in Citizens United, it is clear that Montana has a 
compelling interest to impose the challenged rationally-tailored statutory 
restrictions”). 
 331. See, e.g., Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 09-0994-CV, 2012 WL 89358, at *1 
(2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2012) (finding that laws reducing the campaign contribution 
limits restricting lobbyists’ contributions “are closely drawn to address the 
significant governmental interest in reducing corruption or the appearance 
thereof”). 
 332. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (explaining how the majority rejects precedent). 
 333. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has 
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the 
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and 
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories).  
 334. See id. (criticizing the use of metaphors without regard for consistency). 
 335. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 33–41 (providing support for the real-
entity theory in the cases preceding Citizens United). 
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Court’s use of statutory construction to interpret precedent or 
statutory law.336  
C. Attacking Public Policy as a Legal Basis in Itself 
The strongest criticism, if not the lack of a strong policy 
foundation, might be that the Court’s idea of policy is simply not 
a good reason to rule in this way. Perhaps other options can 
bypass the reliance on public policy arguments. Some people 
(humans, no doubt) have advocated for “a constitutional 
amendment that removes for-profit corporations from the speech 
protections of the First Amendment.”337 Congress could 
potentially effect a similar result pursuant to its Commerce 
Clause authority by requiring a Federal Charter stipulating that 
corporations do not have constitutional protection of personal 
rights such as speech. Despite the overwhelming strength of 
corporations in the lobbying sphere and in electioneering,338 
individuals at least carry the right to vote if the majority 
opposing Citizens United is truly overwhelming. 
Although a basis in policy arguments can be weaker than one 
in case or statutory law, policy can be very important in 
situations involving the mass public, such as election law.339 
Further, a primary check the public has on the U.S. Supreme 
Court is to lobby the legislature after an unpopular ruling based 
on policy or statutory grounds,340 a concept tainted by the fact 
                                                                                                     
 336. See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (applying a 
construction analysis of the language in the statute). 
 337. Robert Weissman, Let the People Speak: The Case for a Constitutional 
Amendment to Remove Corporate Speech from the Ambit of the First 
Amendment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 979, 980–81 (2011) (arguing for a constitutional 
amendment after Citizens United). 
 338. See, e.g., OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 29, 2012) (providing data about lobbying expenditures) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 339. See, e.g., Robert W. Lee, Pre-Election Initiative Review in Florida: A 
Framework for Analysis, 69 FLA. B.J. 14, 15 (1995) (discussing public policy 
considerations regarding courts’ interfering with the election process). 
 340. See Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence 
of Juries: Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1274 (1996) (discussing the legislature as a checking 
function for the public). 
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that lobbyists are often corporations or influenced by them. 
Citizens United, however, based its ruling on the Constitution.341 
This ups the ante for legislatures, and hence the public, to 
challenge the ruling: it essentially requires another Court’s 
decision overturning Citizens United or a constitutional 
amendment.342 Therefore, if the Citizens United Court failed to 
adequately justify its decision, and if the public’s fears 
materialize, then policy might ultimately be sufficient grounds to 
challenge the ruling.343  
VI. Conclusion 
The U.S. Supreme Court has equivocated and even, over 
time, contradicted itself in its use of corporate-rights 
metaphors.344 The Court has at times even succumbed to the 
error of deducing functional corporate rights from some 
metaphysical essence of a corporation.345 This foundation has 
perpetuated the error because the public resounds the ruling 
(with the compounded effect of a media spin),346 and it has alerted 
the public to rightly question the Court’s conception of corporate 
form. The public’s overwhelming criticism of Citizens United 
reveals an important point in the discussion of corporate form: 
the U.S. Supreme Court has provided inadequate guidance for its 
                                                                                                     
 341. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (stating that the 
First Amendment does not give the government the authority to restrict 
corporate political speech). 
 342. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
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justification of the corporate right to speech.347 By virtue of the 
Court’s failure to explain the source of the corporate right to 
political speech, Citizens United has the unintended consequence 
of revealing that corporate-rights theories are altogether 
ineffective as inherent truths about corporations.348 (Still, with 
precise language, commentators can use the theories in the 
metaphysical sense to articulate justifications for various laws, so 
long as the theories are not used as the source of those laws.) 
With respect to independent expenditures, the Citizens United 
Court finds the source of the corporate right not in some 
metaphysical corporate essence, but rather in public policy.349 
Many voices ought to be heard in the political sphere, and the 
true protection of the public’s voice lies in proper discussion about 
corporate theory and what we realistically want corporations to 
be.350 
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